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I. INTRODUCTION: AN “OWNERSHIP SOCIETY” THAT WE CAN CALL OUR OWN
The idea of an “ownership society” is hardly new to American politics or law. Indeed it
might be called the seventeen year cicada of American domestic policy – emerging once per
generation onto the national agenda, generating just a bit of buzz, then receding once again to
leave a mass of empty husks and buried eggs behind. Unlike the furtively flourishing insects,
however, ownership-promoting proposals seldom have, upon emergence, crescendoed to a
deafening din. Nor have they sounded the same notes to everyone’s ears.1 Rather, “ownership
solutions” 2 and their cognates – “homesteading,”3 “stakeholding,” 4 “assets for the poor,”5 etc. –
have been proffered to or on behalf of differing constituencies for differing reasons, and thus
have tended to mean different things to different people. It is tempting to hypothesize that it is
just this fragmentation and this polyvalence that account, at least in part, both for the general
idea’s recurrence and for its every time receding.6
This Article is written with a view to synthesis and in the hope of permanence. It is
predicated on the premise that the notion of an “ownership society” is both so close and so
important to us that we never have stepped back from it to view it as one whole. We have yet to
theorize it and pursue it as one comprehensive public project. We have spoken more of
“programs” than “societies,” leaving the ideal that animates the programs insufficiently
articulated or elaborated. That ideal, in turn, by dint of both its being left implicit and its mythic
resonance with who we like to think we are, often has prevented us from thinking-through the
detailed and pragmatic requisites of ownership. And so it has resulted indirectly in some failures
of some “programs” – and an undue pessimism, in the wake of failure, over what “society” can
do to advance “ownership”.
By drawing out explicitly the ways in which the mythos of an “ownership society” has
made covert appeal to the three distinct but overlapping strands that constitute our national selfunderstanding, and by illustrating how that rough ideal in turn recurs covertly in specific
programs and proposals, we can lay the groundwork for a more coherent and enduring public
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project: the commitment to a broader ownership of value-productive and -retentive assets by all
of our citizens. That commitment would seem all the more fulfillable today than in the past, in
view of new finance-technologies that scarcely could have been envisaged in the past. All that’s
wanting, then, would seem to be the aforementioned synthesis and full articulation – and the
institutional design that gives concrete, informed expression to it.
If I am correct in this, then we are faced here, now that “ownership” and “society” are
uttered in one breath, and now that “finance” can “engineer” what hitherto has not been
engineerable, with a most extraordinary opportunity. We face the chance at last to reconcile our
longest-running, mutually antagonistic views of government and public policy. We face the
chance to usher-in what might be called “a Jeffersonian republic by Hamiltonian means.”7
In Part II, then, this Article provides a brief elaboration of our three political selfunderstandings – what I’ll call the civic republican, classical liberal and pragmatic
consequentialist traditions. It emphasizes in particular the first two understandings’ shared and
still compelling vision of a free – and freeholding – citizenry who jointly constitute a virtuous res
publica; and the third tradition’s emphasis upon “results,” experimentalism, basic fairness and
efficiency. My claim is that these three traditions still, between them, add up to our vision of
ourselves as a society – and that they are fully reconcilable for purposes of thinking-through and
bringing-in an “ownership society”.
Part III synthesizes one self-understanding from the three traditions laid out in Part II,
with the aim of shifting from a retrospective and contemporary to a forward-looking point of
view. It braids the overlapping strands together into one coherent, systematic public
understanding of what “ownership society” should broadly mean. And in doing so it sketches
two broad strategies for realizing that society.
Part IV then lays out the detailed contours, requisites, and full significance of “owning”
in that “ownership society.” In effect, it bridges broader policy to detailed program. It does so
by translating ethically intelligible “resource” and “opportunity” into legally and psychologically
cognizable “asset” and “ownership”. In effecting that translation, Part IV arrives at more
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specific prescriptions and strategies for putting into place a distinctively American ownership
society.
Part V concludes the Article and sets the stage for the sequel’s shift from ideological and
legal synthesis to policy and programmatic synthesis. That shift finds its consummation in both
(a) a consolidation and reinterpretation of past “ownership society” programs and proposals, and
(b) a unified package of programmatic proposals of its own which shares the strengths and skirts
the weaknesses of those past attempts at realizing aspects of an ownership society.
“Consolidation” and “reinterpretation,” “strength” and “weakness” there, of course, are
understood by reference to those synthesized ideals and prescriptions that the present Article
develops.
Part V also cautions against confounding “ownership societies” with polities in which we
simply own some things or are simply “on our own.” An efficient equal-opportunity republic,
that is to say, is not to be confused with a banana republic. My hope is that the earlier Parts’ full
elaboration of our fully shared self-understanding and of that understanding’s partial realization
in informed institutional design, will have served to minimize the risk of that conflation.
II. OWNING UP TO WHO WE ARE: THREE POLITICAL SELF-UNDERSTANDINGS
This Part briefly adumbrates three dominant traditions of American self-understanding. In
a crucial sense, these traditions constitute three comprehensive views of who we are. Like others
at least in respect of the first two, I call them the “Civic Republican,” “Classical Liberal” and
“Pragmatic Consequentialist” traditions. An American OS will have to be reflective of all three.
A. Civic Republicans
Civic Republicanism (CR) and its late 20th Century rediscovery are well surveyed and
discussed in the legal, historic and normative political-theoretic literatures.8 Here the focus is on
CR’s basic tenets and enduring presence in American public policy. Ownership – or
“freeholding” – figures prominently in those tenets and in that enduring presence.
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Like most ideological traditions, CR constitutes an integrated cluster of ethical, political
and economic ideals. It is the latter-day expression of an earlier-elaborated idealization of a
particular form of life, lived by a particular segment of Roman society, prior to the coming of
Empire from about 60 B.C.E. to 14 C.E.9 The idealization process began in earnest with the
nostalgic Roman poets and historians of the late Republican and early Empire periods,10 then
resurfaced in Renaissance Florence during the 16th Century. The loci classici are the philosophic
and historic writings of Machiavelli and Guicciardini, who cast their city-state as a revived
Roman republic.11 The Florentines’ elegiac theorization of republican Rome made its way
northward, through the Netherlands and ultimately into Britain, over the subsequent century. In
Britain the most celebrated republican exponents were the “Whig” polemicists of the late 17th
and early 18th Century English “Country” opposition, notably Bolingbroke and Harrington, who
deplored the era’s centralization of political and financial power in the Crown and in London.12
These writers assimilated the Roman and Florentine ideals to the “freedom-vindicating” English
common law, particularly in its storied Anglo-Saxon form in which the local freeholder, as juror,
played a conspicuous role in applying, sometimes nullifying, and thus developing, the law.13
The Whigs also assimilated the Roman/Florentine ideal to the agrarian way of life familiar to the
English country squire.14
Through Bolingbroke, Harrington and the pamphleteers and playwrights who popularized
them,15 the images and ideals of the Anglo-European republican tradition exerted a critical
formative influence upon the attitudes, the thinking, and the very self-conceptions of those
radicals who led the American revolt against the British Parliament and Crown.16 Those same
radicals included many who would frame and promote, as well as many who would oppose and
resist, ratification of the US constitution.17 Many of the same persons and their ideological
descendents, in turn, prominently set or opposed much nationally formative public policy
through the new American republic’s early decades as a nation.18 And as we shall see, many of
their ideals continue, in only minimally altered and updated form, as our ideals.
Central to CR, again as to most ideological traditions, is a defining conception of human
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nature at its basest and most elevated. And there is a corresponding view of the appropriate
forms and roles of political and economic, therefore legal, organization. To CR thinking, baser
human nature seeks dominion, unchecked ownership. It seeks dominion not just over nature for
the satisfaction of one’s basic needs, but over more than what is needed. Unchecked, the lust for
power and for acquisition issues forth in tyranny, the grab for full control over resources, over
one’s fellows – in essence, merely a species of resource – and indeed over all that one is able to
acquire or subdue.19
One’s fellows, however, offer one redemption of a sort. Not only do they check the
spread of one’s dominion; they constitute a means by which to check and to transmogrify one’s
power-lust itself. For one must reason – or at least must bargain – with one’s fellows if a
constant state of wasteful war would be avoided. One has, and to some unspecified Aristotelian
degree is even naturally disposed, to cooperate with others to address the challenges posed to all
by resource-scarcity and potentially wasteful, destructively competitive activity. And one must
deliberate, even come to share a common sense of purpose with one’s fellows if one would work
effectively with them through time.20
The acts of deliberation, cooperation and coordination in communion with others
transmute one’s baser human nature into something nobler in the CR story. The desire for
dominion over resources becomes productive economic activity and conduces to nongluttonous
self-sufficiency – a partial liberation from, rather than obliteration of, the natural environment.
The desire for dominion over one’s neighbors becomes the sense of self-worth and fundamental
dignity essential to effective while not overreaching action, and therefore to effective selfgovernment. Rather than a world of one or several power-maddened tyrants owning all and
lording over everyone such as each person’s boundless will, unchecked, would seek, CR sees a
world of many virtuous and sober nobles. Each such noble holds a humbler realm – his “estate”
– and each regards the others as rough equals in shared thought and action. Will is modulated
into “virtue” – a critical republican watch-word – which in turn is seen at least in part in social
terms – in this case, the value of a social equilibrium of roughly equal, moderated wills and
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equal, moderated spheres of human action.
Society and individual, then, are mutually dependent in a fundamental symbiosis to the
CR way of thinking. And both as cause and as effect, in turn, of the virtuous republic, CR sees
each citizen as owning some proportional allotment of the aggregate of substrate resources – the
stuff on which the peoples’ lives are made.21 As effect, because one crucial reason for and
product of the binding together of persons into society is the stable apportionment of lifesustaining materials among potentially competing claimants.22 And as cause, because in order
truly to participate responsibly on equal terms in shared public life, one must both hold a stake in
the aggregate of resources with which public life is fundamentally concerned, and possess that
dignity and self-respect and partial independence which such stakeholding confers.
It is not surprising, then, that the idealized Virgilian or Virginian “yeoman farmer,” and
that polity which he and counterparts had seemed to constitute in republican Rome, in postMagna Carta England, and in parts of British North America came to occupy a hallowed role in
the CR imagination. Arable land, at least until a century ago, was the productive, autonomyconferring resource par excellence. And it bound the owner to his community: The freeholder
was a nobler and accountable, less exploitative and irresponsible figure than the “absentee
landlord”.23 The early Roman citizen-soldier-farmer, beneficiary of Greek learning yet free of
corrupting Athenian urbanity, was the very prototype of sober-minded, nature- and natural lawrespecting Stoic dignity. And he was, of course, the prototype of the American “Minute Man.”
The Roman Senate was in turn the very prototype of purposeful and public-spirited deliberation
– as well, of course, as of the US Senate. And the seizure of power by, and the subsequent
imperium and “mob”-dependence of, Julius Caesar and his successors constituted a mythic
“Fall” of nearly Biblical proportion.24 It illustrated both the constant vulnerability of virtue to
lust, immoderate acquisition and corruption, and the ever-present danger that virtuous republican
political-economy and self-government might degenerate into plutocracy, demagoguery and
dictatorship.25
Before turning to the enduring appeal of CR thinking in American political and economic
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life, we’ll do well to take explicit note of the ambivalent role that rough material equality plays
in that tradition. On the one hand, the place of egalitarian thinking in CR seems manifest. It is
the rough equality of human capacities, along with the rough identity of human interests and
corruptibility that render mutual support rather than mutual antagonism so well-advised. And the
coordinately idealized image of “every man [as] a king”26 (his “home being his castle”) implicit
in the vision of that “sturdy yeomanry” which serves as “backbone” to republican selfgovernment bears obvious egalitarian significance. It is doubtless partly for this very reason that
the ascendancy of “Jeffersonian democracy” in early 19th Century America is seen both as a
triumph of CR – Jefferson having been the arch-republican of early American politics – and of
democratic egalitarianism.27
Yet on the other hand, to remain with Jefferson for a moment, that arch-republican also
held aristocratic pretensions, as did many of his peers including that other great republican icon,
George Washington.28 Both men actually owned human beings, moreover, and saw themselves
as members of an almost “natural” ruling class. That class’s lot – worn ostentatiously as
“burden”29 – was periodically to serve the people notwithstanding the alleged distastefulness of
public life, then retire in noble dignity to their “ranches” or estates once national emergencies
were past.30 Beyond that, what was to be done once all new lands were appropriated? Were we
then to take from the over- to give to the under-endowed if ownership-imbalances came to afflict
the republic and threaten effective self-government? This faultline over who it is who should be
“equal” and how equity should be maintained, possibly the product of incompletely worked-out
ideals, possibly that of an incomplete commitment, runs throughout the CR tradition as it unfolds
through American political and economic history.31
Present-day historians are broadly united in attributing the essentials of CR to the
political-psychological and interpretive predispositions of those late-18th Century Americans
who led the revolt against the British Parliament and Crown and founded one of the first of
modern republics.32 The vocabularies, style of thinking, even style of dress of the American
founders all were quite self-consciously republican in nature. CR attitudes and thinking also are
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quite prominent in early policies and controversies advocated, implemented and/or argued over
during the first decades of the American republic.
Of greatest consequence for present purposes are early American land, trade and
industrial policy. One of the first American changes to the English common law was the
abolition of fee tail and primogeniture, this with a view to broadening the incidence of
freeholding across the population.33 Early efforts to restrict the franchise to land-holders also are
well noted, if not indeed notorious. 34 And these need not be thought as inegalitarian as they are
simply stakeholder-voter-oriented.35 The Northwest Ordinance, in turn, immediately opened
federal lands to westward migrants. The aim in this case was not simply to subject those lands to
productive cultivation – a pragmatic consequentialist aim which I discuss below – and certainly
not, in conception, to enable existing land-owners simply to enlarge their estates. The aim was,
rather, to foster the expansion of a populace of responsible republican freeholders.36 Jefferson’s
Louisiana Purchase, of doubtful constitutionality but a perceivedly exigent opportunity, was
actuated by essentially the same ideological vision – simultaneously egalitarian, national
resource-expanding, and broad, productive ownership-fostering.37
Similar understandings prompted the Jeffersonians’ – including Madison’s – opposition
to tariffs on imported manufactured goods.38 The republicans rejected tariffs not as early, preRicardian exponents of the efficiencies of free trade, or as prophets of an early 19th Century
WTO. Rather, they opposed them because tariffs appeared likely both to harm the interests of
American farmers and to foster American industrialization and consequent urbanization – both of
which the Jeffersonians rejected on CR ideological grounds.39 Jefferson and his many influential
followers simply sought a different America than that sought by Hamilton and his allies.
Hamiltonians saw a more or less autarkic, independent state with a well developed internal
division of labor and advanced industrial capacity, able to participate on equal terms with other
economically advanced states on the world stage. Jeffersonians saw a nation of autarkic
households, all of whom owned enough land to support themselves and purchase inexpensive
implements from the “slave house” manufactories of Europe. Those households therefore would
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possess sufficient productive autonomy and leisure to take part on more or less equal terms with
one another in the strictly limited affairs of collective self-government.40 Yet both sides argued
their positions in similar terms – the terms of CR self-sufficiency.41
In the end, of course, neither Hamilton’s nor Jefferson’s vision of America decisively
edged-out the other. And this, we’ll see below, is because those visions actually are
complementary. Jefferson was more than magnanimous, he was in a way prophetic, when in his
first inaugural he announced that “we are all Federalists, we are all Republicans.”42 What is
more immediately to present purposes is how Jeffersonian visions – even as the trajectory of
economic development steadily rendered America more Hamiltonian and urban-industrial than
Jeffersonian or rural-agrarian – continued to resonate in American political discourse and public
policy.43
Perhaps most conspicuous among latter-day Jeffersonian national policies has been the
Homestead Act of 1862, discussed at greater length in this Article’s sequel. At a time when the
US already had begun to rival Britain as the most thoroughly industrialized society among the
community of nations, and when the urban-industrial North – under the new, “Republican”
Party’s first president, Abraham Lincoln – was decisively and Hamiltonianly federalizing the
nation in disciplining the ersatz-Jeffersonian, “anti-federalist,” plutocratic plantation-based
agricultural South,44 national policy aimed nonetheless to take population pressure off of the
cities, develop internal lands, and in so doing broaden the class of independent, responsible,
productive freeholding citizens.45 The terms in which this legislation was proposed and
advocated could have come from Jefferson or Harrington or Tacitus himself.46 Similar actuating
aims prompted early proposals to afford each freed slave in the US “forty acres and a mule,”
these latter resources to be derived from the break-up of the large, extended Southern
haciendas.47 CR thinking also is evident in the continual romanticization, to this day, of “the
family farm,” “the small farmer” and his simple virtues in connection with federal farm and even
estate tax-reduction policies. And this is notwithstanding that such policies tend actually,
nowadays, to benefit agricultural conglomerates and dynastic families rather than the humble
Center for Social Development
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Stoic free-holder.
Chords similar to those sounded by 19th Century land and trade policy continued to
resonate, until early in the 20th Century, in labor and industrial policy debate. While it is by now
a commonplace to associate labor and wage income in near Pavlovian fashion, that association
was hotly contested through most of the 19th Century.48 Much of the agenda of the labor
movement up until the 1890s did not concern itself with raising wages, shortening the work week
or improving working environments. Rather, that agenda aimed at abolishing the wage system
altogether and replacing it with a system of worker ownership and consumer/producer
cooperatives – early prototypes of today’s ESOPs.49 The displacement of artisanal and craft
production by highly centralized, bureaucratically organized modes was seen, and constantly
described, as a threat to the dignity of work and the independence of the citizenry – hence, to the
enduring of republican self-government itself.50 Though it seems to be forgotten now, today’s
Republican Party during its early years in the late 1850s – as well as, again, its first successful
US presidential candidate, Abraham Lincoln – were as opposed to “wage slavery” in the North
as they were to chattel slavery in the South.51 And the most influential labor organization in
America up into the 1880s, the Knights of Labor, both devoted itself to the abolition of wage
labor and articulated its positions in starkly CR terms.52
The same terms figured into late 19th and early 20th Century industrial policy – sometimes
simply as advocated by sizable numbers of Progressive and Democratic Party-members and
platform-formulators, sometimes as actually implemented. Woodrow Wilson’s “New Freedom,”
for example, sought to diminish the size of at least non-“natural” business concentrations53 on
grounds that on the whole less concentration meant more business-owners, hence more CR
citizens. Louis Brandeis, an architect of Wilson’s early policies, advocated businessfragmentation on the same grounds even where economies of scale might render concentration
“natural” or efficient. 54 The early history of American antitrust policy featured arguments along
the same lines, even to the point of permitting some forms of integration – resale price
maintenance arrangements, for example, which resulted in higher consumer prices. The reason
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was that such arrangements nonetheless facilitated republican freedom by ensuring a larger
number of independently owned and operated retail establishments.55 Consumer interests –
hence, lower prices and perhaps therefore greater social efficiency in the form of aggregated
welfare – of course ultimately became the sole touchstone of antitrust policy. But “producer”
interests – at any rate, shop-owner interests – for a long while figured prominently, both in
legislative argument and in court decisions, again for explicitly articulated, CR-grounded
reasons.56
We find CR thinking and its exaltation of nonurbane simplicity, plain-spokenness,
moderation, hard work, productive virtue, independence and self-sufficiency in more than landtalk, farm-talk, tax-talk and early labor and antitrust talk. We find it in the continuing deploring
of “dependency,” “indignity” and “laziness” which some have claimed to find associated with
US welfare programs prior to the “end of welfare as we [knew] it.”57 We find it in attacks upon
“the special interests in Washington” and “beltway thinking” by the self-styled virtuous
bumpkins and “outsiders” who run for (Washington, beltway) office. We find it in some calls
for campaign finance and electoral reform, and for an associated return to a more “deliberative
democracy.”58 We find it in calls for “restorative justice” and “alternative dispute resolution” to
replace “liberal” rights- and rules-oriented litigation, on grounds that the former, in contrast to
the latter, foster shared understanding and civic cohesion.59 We find it in advocacy and
implementation of term-limits for legislators and executives, and the correlative deplorings of a
“professional political class.”60 We find it still enshrined in our very constitution, in the
Guarantee Clause.61 (Some find it in the First Amendment too.62) And we find somewhat
attenuated CR thematics at work in a great many proposals of recent years advocating
“stakeholding” in the forms of employee-owned enterprise, “privatized” Social Security
“personal retirement accounts,” ever more tax-advantaged “individual retirement accounts,”
matching-funded “individual development accounts,” “universal savings accounts,” and even
lump-sum transfers to all newborn children or adults upon attainment of adulthood.63
What most if not all of these disparate proposals and rhetorical posturings have in
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common are their idealizations of individual responsibility, self-sufficiency, civic participation
and in many cases greater relative equality on the one hand, their associations of these virtues
with a secure, healthy, well-functioning, self-governing democratic-republican polity on the
other. Probably for this very reason, most of these proposals also exert a certain attraction over
the thinking of “capital letter” Republicans and Democrats alike. Again, Jefferson was prescient
in proclaiming that, at least in one sense, “we are all [Civic] Republicans.” I’ll exploit that fact
below and in the sequel, in a synthesis of national self-understanding that can animate a
distinctively American “ownership society”.
B. Classical Liberals
Before the relatively recent revival of interest in CR and its role in the American political
tradition, the role of classical liberalism (CL) had figured prominently in the work of an earlier
generation of historians.64 CL and its modern variants might in fact constitute the only
ideological tradition more discussed, defended and elaborated through the years in the periodic
legal and philosophic literatures than CR itself.65 Once again, then, we can here confine
ourselves to laying out the broader contours, highlighting some inner tensions, and indicating
some ownership-pertinent currents in American public policy that are readily appreciable as CL
in spirit.
CL has little – though certainly something – to do with “liberalism” understood in that
pejorative sense employed by self-styled “conservative”66 pundits and politicians. Again like CR
and other ideological traditions, it constitutes an integrated cluster of ethical, political and
economic understandings – understandings largely held in common by present-day “liberals” and
“conservatives” alike. As with CR, we find in CL a view of human nature, a coordinate view of
the proper role of social organization, and thus a view about appropriate political, economic and
legal arrangements. Also as with CR, we find ambivalence – now sharpened – toward equality.
Indeed we might view CL as a sharpened, “streamlined” version of CR itself, a successor to that
earlier tradition in societies that have moved from being homogeneously agricultural to
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heterogeneously commercial and industrial in nature.
On the question of human nature, CL is more subtle than CR. In keeping with its relative
modernity, it purports to be noncommittal on the metaphysics or psychology of the subject. Yet
CL would seem to be committed nonetheless to some conception of the self by virtue of what it
demands on selves’ behalves.67 Central to CL is the concept of autonomy – the fundamental
right of individuals to shape their lives, their destinies, their very personalities or selves.68 Hence
the canonical CL rights to “life,” to “liberty,” to “the pursuit of happiness” and “property.”69
The first is self’s organic substrate, the second its sphere of unconstrained activity. The third
connotes the self’s self-chosen ends in acting – in contemporary terms, its “plan of life”70 – and
the fourth is that material which selves must use in seeking ends and in becoming, shaping or
determining themselves. The notion of an “ownership society,” we’ll see, requires that we think
about the proper boundaries of and relations among these four CL autonomy-related rights.
The only restriction of autonomy typically recognized as legitimate by pure CL finds
expression in the proverbial kicker, “as consistent with the freedom of others.”71 Drawing the
line of demarcation between legitimate autonomy and externality implicit in this formula of
course has proved to be conceptually and practically perplexing.72 But intuitively the notion
strikes one – at any rate the typical American – as more or less “natural.” It is implicit in the
familiar ideas that “what you do in your own home – though not in public – is your own
affair”;73 that “my right to swing my fist ends at your nose”; that “I have the right to control my
own – but not your – body”; that “with freedom comes responsibility – the responsibility to
respect the equal freedom of others”; and so on.
The CL shrinkage of the locus – as it were the beneficiary – of autonomy from the CR
household to the individual, and its counterpart expansion of the sphere of autonomy to all
materials that might go into fabrication of the self – as distinguished from the autarkic familial
estate – results in a metamorphosis of the CR conceptions of virtue and value. Value in the CR
tradition is that which is valued by jointly deliberating and cooperating freeholders sharing a
more or less common – agricultural – form of life. Ends, and with them value, accordingly are
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more or less homogeneous among CR’s constituent households. It unproblematically makes
sense to speak of “social value” in the CR tradition. Value to unadulterated CL, by contrast, is,
like CL’s constituents and their forms of life, more disaggregated and various. “Social” value, in
so far as the phrase bears meaning, therefore comes to be seen as a dynamic composite of or
shifting equilibrium among many distinct individual valuations. Markets therefore ought,
though oddly seldom do, come to figure prominently as preferred sites of valuational expression
and allocation in at least a thorough-going CL thinking.74 (Part III will exploit this role.) They
are sites where the aggregation of relative valuations of disparate goods traded by disparate
persons potentially provides, in the form of relative prices, the only ethically cognizable relative
“social” valuation of goods.75
In the less market-oriented idiom more familiar to Rawlsian liberals, a “thick” conception
of the good – i.e., a widely shared, more detailed specification of what constitutes the good life76
– yields in CL to a “thin” conception. Under the latter, “the” good life is simply any life that is
rationally planned in accordance with the autonomous agent’s view of what constitutes a good
life. “Comprehensive views” – conceptions of “the” good life – are restricted to like-minded
individuals, hence to the “private” realm. “Public” life, by contrast, is governed only “thinly” by
such minimal principles as conduce to each person’s roughly equal capacity to formulate and
pursue her own “thick” conception of the good life. It is as though the CR respect for the rough
equality of “power” among freeholders has been modernized to respect for the rough equality of
individuals’ “life-planning” or “happiness-pursuing” autonomy.
One aspect of the CL respect for equal life-planning or happiness-pursuing autonomy – at
least where it is thorough-going and consistent – is respect for every person’s equal claim upon
the stock of resources exogenously available for such pursuit.77 Full solicitude for CL’s right to
liberty, that is, requires that special attention be paid CL’s right to property. This takes us to the
importance of the aforementioned liberty/externality boundary to the realm of ownership itself,
not just to the realm of action: What one may own, not just what one may do, becomes a
politically critical question. The material implications of equality thus come to constitute yet
Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

14

more acute a matter for CL even than for CR. Part III seeks to work a resolution to the problem
in synthesizing CL with CR and with the other dominant American political tradition. For the
moment I simply highlight the importance of the problem to CL in its “sharpened” form:
The liberal conception of the self as work of art can grow particularly nettlesome when
attention turns to the artist’s materials. For CR the matter was in some ways simpler than it is for
CL. Worthwhile life took essentially one form – agrarian. Households accordingly sought
ownership of a more or less homogeneous good – arable land. Rough equality in holdings of that
resource was both a predicate and a goal of successful republican self-government. What to do,
then, in theory was clear: Allocate land more or less equitably. And rough equality in holdings
of land, in view of its relative homogeneity, would have presented but minimal measurement
difficulties. It was only in practice that problems might have arisen – problems rooted in the
psychology of ownership charted infra, Part IV.
For CL, by contrast, where many forms of worthwhile life, not just agrarian life, are
pursued, a greater variety of resource-types go into happiness-pursuit. Those resources are
heterogeneous, perhaps incommensurable. Thus it is no longer immediately apparent what
roughly “equal claims” to such resources can mean. Add to this fact the fact that CL historically
has emphasized community, hence mutual responsibility, less heavily than has CR, and it grows
particularly puzzling just what “we” are required to do, if anything, about disparities in
happiness-pursuing opportunity. State action to redistribute resources in keeping with fair
distribution principles, moreover, would involve organized coercion – the abusive use of which
is something against which both CR and CL counsel that the citizenry remain ever-vigilant. In
view of uncertainty, then, in addition to traditional CL suspicion of authority and CL downplaying of responsibility, concerted egalitarianly-motivated action can appear, superficially at
any rate – especially to those from whom the state might confiscate – an affront to, rather than a
vindication of, liberal autonomy itself. CL therefore bears within itself in practice, if not in
theory, ambivalence toward equality quite counterpart to that displayed by CR. That
ambivalence finds expression in the divide between self-professed “libertarian” and “egalitarian”
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adherents to the liberal tradition.78
On the other hand, by CL’s own lights, it cannot be the case that we are required to do
nothing about resource inequities. It is “self-evident” that one’s successful “pursuit of
happiness” depends critically upon her holdings of “property”. What sense is there in the claim
that “all men are created equal,” and in the consequent exaltation of each person’s equal right to
pursue happiness, if the practical capacity to realize that right might differ quite dramatically
from individual to individual according as each is born, altogether faultlessly and arbitrarily, to
different parents, different educational and social opportunities, and so on? For liberalism not to
degenerate into mere libertinism, then, and for the freedom of one to be consistent with the equal
freedom of others, some degree or form of “initial” opportunity- or resource-equalizing must be
advocated by the thoroughgoing liberal. It is the counterpart, in the realm of material ownership,
to the CL “fist and nose” question that arises in the realm of action. Unearned inegality is
externality as surely as is legally discouraged tortious behavior.
The CL tradition, complete with inner tensions, figures prominently in many of the
seminal writings and debates that, in tandem with the CR tradition, both stamped and reflected
the thinking of the American founders. Most American secondary school or university students
are exposed to the CL notion of a voluntarist “social contract” that has so influenced our
society’s self-understanding from its earliest days.79 Most students probably also have been
exposed to the writings of those 16th, 17th and 18th Century CL philosophers from whom the
notion derives, and are familiar with the influence that those writings – particularly those of
Hobbes, Locke, possibly Rousseau and certainly Montesquieu – directly exerted over the minds
of the American founders.80 Indeed, the best known product of the mind of that most celebrated
of American civic republicans – Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence, from which the earlier
mentioned enumeration of rights to life, liberty etc. derives – is widely observed to read quite
nearly as an abstract of Locke’s Second Treatise on Government, a classic liberal sourcebook.81
The “individualism” – as distinguished from CR “solidarism” – that is characteristic of
the CL sensibility also has been a commonplace among the “ordinary people” of America from
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early on in the republic’s social history. That feature finds expression to this day in, among other
places, the fact that our most frequently encountered interpretations of the aforementioned
“social contract” seem to involve more conditions that we impose upon “society” in return for
our “consent” to join, than conditions to which we agree to subject ourselves in return for
society’s protection. Probably the most authoritative historical observer of this American liberal
individualism was, of course, de Tocqueville, who both charted the rootedness of individualism –
hence, CL – in American communal localism – CR – and drew attention to the ever-present
danger that the former might subvert the latter.82 We find this very tension singled-out and
worried-over to this day, most recently in a spate of Tocquevillian-ringing critiques of
contemporary American CL sensibility.83
Probably those great American public debates in which CL and its tensions have figured
most prominently have been legal – above all, constitutional – in nature. Much of First
Amendment jurisprudence can be read as an attempt by judges to demarcate classic CL
boundaries – the boundary between “public” and “private,” and the boundary between legitimate
liberty and impermissible cost-externalization broadly defined. With respect to the
public/private divide, one conventional view of the courts’ Religion Clauses jurisprudence is that
it is aimed simultaneously at safeguarding individuals’ right to form and live-out their
“comprehensive views” of “the good life” free of state coercion, and at preventing the state from
favoring some such comprehensive views over others.84 With respect to the liberty/externality
divide, the courts have famously judged the proverbial shouting of “Fire!” in the crowded theatre
to fall squarely on the externality side of the divide.85 But they of course struggle to this day
over where “hate speech,” some forms of commercial speech and pornography, and political
campaign expenditure fall.86
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment “substantive” due process jurisprudence tracks First
Amendment jurisprudence in its puzzling over where to draw the line of demarcation between
private and public, liberty and externality.87 Lochner infamously favored libertarian-liberal
freedom of contract over egalitarian-liberal equalizing of de facto bargaining power and
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consequent opportunity.88 Those decisions of the 1930s circumventing or implicitly repudiating
Lochner – not surprisingly through the collectivity-concerning Commerce Clause – emphasized
effects beyond the farm wrought by the farmer, so to speak. They did so at the forthrightly
acknowledged cost of individual farmers’ more immediate and uncoordinated freedoms.89 The
“civil libertarian” decisions of the later 1950s through the early 1990s90 resurrected substantive
due process, this time on behalf of so-called “civil” as opposed to “economic” rights. The latter,
oddly, were – and oft still are – said to have been “discredited,” rather than simply incorrectly
demarcated, by Lochner.91 Quite like Lochner itself, however, certain of these civil libertarian
decisions arguably strengthen the autonomy of some by permitting perceivedly unjust costexternalization onto others. To some abortion rights opponents, for example, it seems a mother’s
rights to liberty and the pursuit of happiness since Roe v. Wade92 may inappropriately trump a
living child’s – an “unborn person’s” – right to life itself.93
It is of course not to present purposes to attempt a definitive solution to all public/private
and liberty/externality CL conundra. What matters for the present is to recognize that, in so far
as we continue to struggle with these problems, we are classical liberals, sometimes with a touch
of civic republicanism added to our mix.94 And we sometimes find our CL struggle taking place
within the context of ownership itself – e.g., in debates over tax policy and in continuing
constitutional controversy over takings and “unconstitutional conditions”.95 What will prove
more helpful in the subsequent portions of this Article is that nonetheless, where ownership is
our interest there is much room for a broad overlapping consensus among classical liberals and
civic republicans alike as to how we should understand and foster ownership. We’ll also see that
that consensus is wide open to our other constitutive political tradition.
C. Pragmatic Consequentialists
Not all public policies need be advocated or defended by reference to systematic
ideologies. Probably most discreet proposals advocated in America – if not indeed in most
English-descended societies with their empiricist, experimentalist intellectual traditions – can by
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dint of their simple instrumental purposes be argued to conform to any number of sophisticated
normative visions. They are simply “good ideas” in any number of senses, are value-wise
overdetermined. And this value-overdetermination can itself be advertised as a value – a sort of
meta-value rather in the way that tolerance constitutes the CL meta-virtue. It therefore would be
convenient to recognize a residual or second order value-space in American public policy,
additional to those determined by CR and CL even were “pragmatism” or “results-orientation”
not a critical part of our American self-understanding.
As it happens, however, pragmatism or results-orientation does constitute a critical part
of our self-understanding. We have prided ourselves precisely on our being a “practical,” as
distinguished from a “doctrinaire,” “closed-minded” or “ideological” people. And indeed the socalled “school” of “pragmatism,” as a philosophic orientation, commonly is said to have
originated in America in the 19th Century – among others, in the thought of Dewey, Pierce and
James.96 Americans’ best-known intervention in the realm of legal theory – so-called “American
Legal Realism” – in turn, for its part can be, and often is, viewed as a kind of “legal
pragmatism,” or “instrumentalist” orientation toward the law itself.97 In the realms of law and
policy alike, then, Americans are thought to care about “results.” We consistently have looked to
likely consequences “on the ground” in addressing legal controversies and public policy
proposals, and have prided ourselves for that.98
Even self-described pragmatists, however, require some criterion or some criteria by
which implicitly or otherwise to judge results or consequences good or ill. Meta-values are not
helpful absent values. One place to look for such criteria on the American scene, of course,
would be the CR and the CL traditions just discussed. In practice, however, the style of thought
that I shall call “pragmatic consequentialist” (PC) in the Anglo-American tradition – including
both the legal and the legislative traditions – has tended toward two simple, stripped-down focal
points as “goodness” determinants. It is these tendencies – both the tendency to settle upon
simple rules of thumb, and the contents of those simple rules themselves – that most (though
only somewhat) distinguish PC from CR, CL and other policy-evaluative traditions. We shall
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see in the next Part, however, that the PC rules of thumb are reconcilable with one another. And
we’ll see that, in so far as each is modulated by the other, both are consonant with CR and CL
where the notion of an “ownership society” is concerned. In fact, it looks as if the PC focal
points are simply stripped-down versions of CL values themselves, rather in the way that CL can
be thought a “streamlined” version of CR.
The first PC focal point is aggregated wealth or welfare. The rule of thumb associated
with that aggregate is to maximize it. The degree of success that a polity attains in seeking to
maximize is the degree of “efficiency” that it achieves. In its earliest formulations, this rule of
thumb was proffered simultaneously with the second PC rule of thumb, considered infra –
equalization. As articulated by the first consequentialists in the Anglo-American policy tradition
– Bentham and his “Utilitarian” followers – appropriate legislation and adjudication were such as
would maximize “the greatest good for the greatest number.”99 Strictly speaking, of course, that
formulation is incoherent; absent one particular happy accident that I shall in a moment specify,
it cannot guide. For it imports two analytically distinct optimanda while providing no instruction
as to how we are to rank-order in circumstances – if any – where they cannot both be optimized.
As it happens, however, the divergence between optimanda is more stark where wealth rather
than welfare is what would be maximized.
Where welfare, not wealth, is maximandum, it often has been thought that a fair degree of
equalization among persons’ consumptions is consistent with the maximization of aggregate
“welfare,” “satisfaction,” “happiness” or “utility.” Bentham and his immediate followers
evidently believed so. The guiding thought is that the more or less familiar phenomenon of
diminishing marginal utility implies that “total happiness” is maximized if all consume a
gracious plenty of consumables rather than if some consume a great deal while others consume
little.100 “Fairness,” then, in at least a simple-minded, equal-holdings sense, could be efficient in
a pre-Paretian or Paretian, welfare-maximizing sense.101 Hence some English PC-predecessor
advocates – including Bentham in the 19th Century, Pigou and Lerner in the early- to mid-20th
Century – as well as some exponents of the “optimal taxation” movement in the later 20th
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Century have advocated some degree of income-equalization as a means to utilitymaximization.102 But of course not everyone has agreed upon the implicit definitions here of
“fairness” and “efficiency.” Nor have all agreed upon the empirical question of the shapes of our
utility functions.
As it happens there has not proved much enduring occasion to sort these matters out for
purposes of mainstream American public policy, at least not in connection with utilitymaximization. For more fundamental difficulties attending utility-measurement and
interpersonal comparison – difficulties we shall treat of more in Part III – themselves resulted in
rapid movement, by the early middle 20th Century, on the part of consequentialists from
Utilitarian to another form of aggregation – that of “wealth” – and thus to a new criterion of
efficiency – so-called Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.103 Roughly, the idea here was that dollar (or
pound sterling) value is a close enough proxy for happiness, while being more readily
measurable both in aggregate and as between persons in the holding, as to constitute a more
appropriate maximandum for purposes of policy.
For a number of reasons and in a number of ways, this shift from welfare to wealth has
proved ethically and indeed conceptually unsatisfactory, though that has not deterred some PC
advocates. First, the continued focus upon aggregate-maximization subjects’ wealthmaximization to the same potential distributive fairness and ethical intelligibility problems that
plague strict Utilitarianism.104 But second, the shift to wealth as maximand severs the link
between equality and efficiency that Utilitarianism could boast at least given certain properties of
utility functions. For while diminishing marginal utility might mean that more equitable
distribution yields higher aggregate utility, it does not mean that more equitable distribution
yields higher wealth. Relatedly, the shift from welfare-maximization to wealth-maximization
renders maximization more overtly fetishistic; we’re maximizing a physical substance, not a
spuriously personified “society”’s purported “pleasure”. And it invites analytic incoherence, as
manifest in the notorious proof that two distributions can be Kaldor-Hicks superior to one
another.105 We’ll address such problems squarely, with a view to solving them for the American
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OS, in the next Part. For present, American tradition-mapping purposes it suffices simply to
highlight this fact: that a conspicuous strand of the American PC tradition in legal and policy
discussion is what we can call the “wealth-maximizing,” or “GDP-max” strand. Lawyers of
course will recognize the prominence of this strand in the “law and economics” movement.106
Followers of policy debate more generally will recognize the presence of such thinking in the
oft-encountered justifications of policies or proposals in terms of their effects upon aggregated
“economic growth”. And they will find it implicit in constant recitations of GDP, DJI,
“productivity” and other aggregate-related figures in both policy debates and daily news reports.
The second PC focal point in the American legal and policy tradition is fairness. Even
aggregationists often seek to justify, or mitigate, their maximizing prescriptions by reference to
fairness-importing or other distribution-germane observations. We saw this just above in
connection with egalitarian utility-maximizers. Examples in the realm of wealth-maximization
include such wearying adages as that “a rising tide lifts all boats”; that maximized wealth
“trickles down”; that “the poor are lazy” or otherwise fault-worthy; that those who are paid most
are those who contribute most (i.e., that they are paid according to their marginal product); that
all persons “would” consent to wealth-maximization as social choice rule were they selecting
such rules from behind a veil of ignorance; and so on.107 All of these familiar claims suggest that
aggregationists are aware, however obliquely, of the ethically objectionable fetishism that
characterizes maximization as a rule of thumb when stripped of distribution or fairness
considerations as co-operative constitutive concerns.
But even apart from such fairness-hedging of the aggregationist position, we find
fairness-oriented or prioritarian108 legislation and jurisprudence themselves as principal kinds
additional to those geared toward wealth-maximization. Indeed, probably the most longremembered, epoch-making court-decisions and legislation of recent decades are of this type – or
of the type that can be viewed as simultaneously maximizing and equalizing. The social
insurance programs put into place during the New Deal, the Employment Act of 1946, the “War
on Poverty” and “Great Society” legislation of the 1960s, and much of the civil rights and antiCenter for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

22

discrimination legislation of the 1940s through the 1990s are among the best-known cases in
point.
We’ll see in the next Part that maximization of any wealth that is conceptually cognizable
– rather than simply labeled – as wealth is complementary with the equalization of – i.e., the fair
distribution of – wealth-creating opportunity. That complementarity is central to showing PC’s
rules of thumb as CR- and CL-resonant norms.

III. DRAWING OUT THE COMMON CORE: OUR EFFICIENT EQUAL-OPPORTUNITY REPUBLIC
An ownership society that we can call our own should give expression, in so far as it is
possible, to the three political traditions that constitute our national self-understanding. With a
view to that end, this Part synthesizes a unified political self-understanding from the three
traditions of American self-understanding laid out in Part II. It does not pretend to find
agreement among the three traditions in respect of all points that matter to them. The claim is
simply that the three traditions can be seen as one on the question of what an American
“ownership society” (hereinafter “OS”) should be. What is needed is first to show that this is so,
and second, for purposes of mutual intelligibility, to forge a neutral vocabulary, usable by all,
which prevents misunderstanding and incorporates the synthesis.
The synthesis proceeds by attending carefully to three constitutive “variables” that any
normative political tradition, if it is to be complete, must fill. In particular, a tradition must
assign values to those three variables if it is to specify the basic contours of an OS. The variables
that must be filled are the gaps opened by the questions (a) “who owns,” (b) “what is owned,”
and (c) “by what general principle or principles are ownership rights determined”.109
I claim that the three American political traditions adumbrated in Part II do in effect fill
the gaps, albeit with differing degrees of explicitness, and that there is broad agreement among
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them in respect of their filling. That means that the values assigned to the variables are
effectively invariant among traditions – meaning in turn that my synthesis’s values are “our” –
American – values where an OS is concerned. The American OS is in that sense the joint
product of the three traditions. It is what we might call, borrowing from the language of all three
of those political self-understandings, an “efficient equal-opportunity republic” (EEOR).

A. Autonomy as Responsible Liberty
All three American political self-understandings effectively construe citizens as
autonomous, boundedly responsible agents.110 That is what “liberty,” when fully thoughtthrough, connotes. Responsible agents effect or affect their own well-being. But they also are
constrained, to indeterminate degree, in so doing by features of the environments into which they
are born. Their inherited capacities – themselves features of those environments – permit them
wide, but nonetheless limited, latitude in altering or exiting their environments.
As an empirical matter, this construal of citizens as agents is consonant with our own
experience of action – of our “moral experience,” so to speak. We experience ourselves and
others as free and as freely choosing. That experience itself is reflected in our familiar capacities
to experience feelings of guilt, shame, frustration with self, resentment of others, and cognate
emotions the reasonability of which presupposes the proposition that people often can choose
other than as they do.111 Yet we also know that we and others are bounded – constrained and
affected – by our backgrounds and environments. Hence we also sometimes experience, again
reasonably, feelings of mercy, forgiveness, and charity toward self and toward others.
As a conceptual matter, the view of citizens as agents underwrites, or is coordinate with,
our belief that others are to be respected. It hangs together with our belief that others bear
dignitary interests and certain fundamental rights – including that to liberty or autonomy – which
Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

24

are coordinate with such interests. It is because we see others as agents, and respect them as
such, that we hold them self-evidently endowed with rights not only to life, but to liberty and the
pursuit of happiness – the rights to build “prosperous” or “meaningful” lives. That it is “their”
pursuit stems from their agency.
It is critical to note in this connection, though it seems to be oft-overlooked at least in the
CL tradition that respect for others’ agency entails more than respect for their freedom to choose
and to act. It also, and equally, entails respect for their living with many of the consequences of
their choices and actions. It entails, that is, our holding others – again, boundedly – responsible.
To let others too often “off of the hook,” for example, with the observation that “they cannot
help it,” would be to view them not as agents – active forgers of fate – but as patients or addicts –
passive objects of fate.112 To let them never off of the hook, of course, also would be
unreasonable. Mercy or charity, in this connection, can be viewed as a kind of compromise, a
reasonable compromise, which as agents we make with our recognition of the limitations of our
own agency. In circumstances that we recognize to be beyond the agency of nearly any among
us save heroes, we “cut” – or recognize – “some slack.” But to allow such exceptions to swallow
the rule – the whole rope to go slack – would be to eschew the category of responsibility, hence
of respect and of agency, altogether.
The appreciation of bounded, responsible agency ultimately underwrites the CR view of
citizens as independent and acquiring but nonetheless corruptible and hyper-acquisitive beings
whose corruptibility and hyper-acquisitiveness are modulated as they respond – and are thus
rendered responsible – to others who are their rough equals in capacity and vulnerability. It also
underlies the CL view of citizens as autonomous but potentially over-reaching selves who
impermissibly externalize costs in so far as they take more than their legitimate shares of benefits
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– selves who must therefore be held to account. Responsible agency does not, on the other hand,
figure prominently into the PC tradition. But neither is there anything in that ad hoc and
minimalist tradition that needs contradict agency.113 Indeed, it will be apparent below that the
only intelligible accounts to be given the familiar PC fairness and efficiency must be understood
by reference to responsible agency. Responsible agents are the only beings in connection with
whom it makes sense to speak of “wealth” as bearing “value” and of “allocations” as being
“fair.”

B. Responsible Liberty as Equal Opportunity
The consensus view of citizens as responsible agents suggests a view of ethically and
politically salient assets – what we shall see in Part IV to constitute the stuff of ownership – as
anything which citizens themselves autonomously value. Assets are what citizens use in seeking
their self-chosen ends, in “pursuing happiness”. Salient liabilities, in turn, are just the converse.
If citizens are agents whose autonomy in defining and pursuing happiness is to be respected, then
the assets that will be of concern to the laws and policies of the CR, CL or PC polity – the EEOR
– will be such distributable items as concern those citizens themselves.
For purposes of a shared civic vocabulary in the EEOR or American OS, the best way to
designate such items of concern – at least the desired ones (assets) – so as both to denote them in
agent-neutral terms and to render transparent the fact that their political cognizability is
dependent upon their relevance to life-building agents, is as generic “resources,” or
“opportunities”. Those are the stuff of which worthwhile lives – as judged by independent,
valuing citizen-agents themselves – are made. Citizens do the life-making, and resources or
opportunities are the materials with which they do that making. Resources or opportunities,
then, are the material correlates of agency itself. Construing citizens as agents commits us to the
Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

26

view that resources or opportunities are the “assets” that a political society of agents like the
American EEOR must view as ethically or politically relevant. They are that in which ownership
rights should inhere.114
It is critical – though again, seemingly oft-overlooked – in this connection that just as
agent-relevant autonomy or liberty is responsible, accountable autonomy or liberty, so is agentrelevant resource or opportunity equitable resource or opportunity. Opportunity-equality is the
material correlate of agent-responsibility, just as opportunity shorn of equality is liberty shorn of
responsibility – is libertinism.115 One is not responsive to the agency of others – one does not
think, opine or act responsibly toward or “account” to them – in so far as one, explicitly or
implicitly, demands greater exogenously given opportunity than they. One does not respect them
as agents, as one’s moral equals – one does not even recognize them as agents at all, rather than
as resources themselves – in so far as one makes or effectively commits oneself to such
demands.116 Call this the “equal opportunity principle” (EOP).
As abstract propositions, these claims, like the construal of citizens as agents, all are
consonant with the constitutive valuations of the CR, CL and PC traditions, hence of the
American tradition. CR is rooted, as observed at Part II.A, inchoately in an equilibrium of
roughly equally empowered persons who would grab all the land that they physically could were
they not constrained by others’ equal grabbing. CL in turn is rooted, as observed at Part II.B,
ultimately in the notion of equilibrium of equal freedoms – practical, not just theoretic freedoms
– held by equal agents. And PC, as noted at Part II.C, settles on the focal points of fairness and
efficiency in its assessments of such public policies as effect distributions of benefit; while
fairness and efficiency, we’ll see, in turn are best construed as properties of distributions that
reflect equality of opportunity and differential result of differential responsible diligence. In
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theory, then, all three American political self-understandings effectively commit themselves to
equal “real” or “material” – not just formal – opportunity.
It might be thought that there cannot be a consensus view among CR, CL and PC on the
matter of responsible liberty’s entailing equal opportunity, at least in so far as the latter term is
taken to embrace material resources. For there does not appear to be an easy consensus even
within each of these traditions on the appropriate distribution of the latter. Did not Part II, in
fact, take explicit note of “ambivalence” in CR, CL and PC over equality? In fact, however, the
appearance of disagreement within traditions is misleading. That appearance owes to two related
factors.
The first, more easily dispatched factor is a semantic ambiguity in the term “resource” –
an ambiguity that also can afflict the term “opportunity,” though it tends not to do so owing to
the more common “default” understanding of the term. “Resource” or “opportunity” can be
taken to denote anything that enters into a “production function,” irrespective of the
circumstances under which the producer has acquired that “input”. Or it can be taken to denote
only such inputs for the possession of which the producer is not actually responsible. We tend
generally to understand “opportunity” in the latter sense, “resource” often in the former sense,
though it is not strictly incorrect to understand either word in either sense.
In order to eliminate the semantic ambiguity, I generically employ – and hereby propose
that the EEOR or American OS employ – the modifier “ethically endogenous” to designate
resources and opportunities for the enjoyment or holding of which agents can reasonably be held
responsible. I propose “ethically exogenous” to designate those for which they cannot. Ethically
exogenous opportunities or resources are “windfalls,” deficits therein “hard luck.” Ethically
endogenous opportunities, resources or deficits therein have been “earned,” or are “deserved.”

Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

28

The ethically endogenous component of one’s holdings, then, is that component for the holding
of which the citizen, conceived as a responsible agent, is appropriately credited or debited – held
ethically deserving or accountable. So far as we know or are led by our experience of agency to
suppose, she could voluntarily have acted or felt, and thus held, differently. And it is profoundly
to disrespect her fundamental agency – to treat her as a passive object of fate rather than as an
active, fate-altering agent – to hold otherwise.
The ethically exogenous portion of one’s holdings is that portion for which she is not
responsible – that portion over the holding of which there is good reason to suppose, in view of
our experience of agency that she bore no choice, or for which she deserves no credit or blame.
And it is profoundly to disrespect her equal ethical standing, prior to acting, not to regard her
unequal holdings, vis a vis other citizens, of this material as actionable absent some compelling
countervailing consideration. It is disrespectful of citizens’ responsible agency, then – their
equal self-constitutive rights, their equal liberty, their equal worth, their equal moral autonomy
and equal accountability – not to work to equalize, so far as this is possible, their ethically
exogenous resources or opportunities. And it is equally disrespectful of citizens’ responsible
agency not to respect variations – inequalities – in their holdings of ethically endogenous
opportunity or resource – i.e., opportunities or resources that they have opened or created or
squandered for themselves, items that they have earned or forgone.117
The second, more difficult factor that sometimes gives rise to an appearance of
disagreement within traditions over the matter of equal resource/opportunity as material correlate
of responsible agency is implicit in the just-drawn endogeneity/exogeneity divide itself. And it
is indeed implicit in the earlier characterization of agency itself as “bounded.” That factor is the
difficulty, at least at the margins, of drawing the boundary. We might call this the “tracing”
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problem – the problem of tracing portions of one’s holdings separately back to ethically
endogenous choice and ethically exogenous circumstance. Where the problem gives rise to
disagreement we might call it, borrowing the suggestive language of the American
Homesteading era, the “boundary dispute”. (I shall employ both locutions.) It is, in fact, simply
the difficulty noted above, at Part II.B, in connection with CL’s conundra over the private/public
and autonomy/externality divides. The same difficulty, in fuzzier form, we observed in the CR
and PC traditions. The EEOR or American OS must face it head-on.
The tracing problem bears both a conceptual and an empirical aspect, though both aspects
intermeld. The conceptual aspect of the problem comes in part with our uncertainty, in
“borderline” cases, over what it is appropriate to hold people responsible for. There is
uncertainty first over whether responsibility should be understood by reference to choice or to
what might be called “ratification.”118 And there is uncertainty second over, if the answer be
choice, what choices truly are “freely” made. In so far as choice is made the touchstone, the
conceptual aspect of the tracing problem mingles with the empirical aspect of the same. The
problem is that there appear to be differing degrees of freedom inhering in differing choices.
One is not simply free or unfree; one is freer or less free in making one’s choices. The concept
of responsibility is thus subject to problems in the application familiar to students of the “logic of
vagueness” since the time of the Sorites paradox at latest.119
Compounding the Sorites-side of the empirical aspect of the tracing problem is the fact
that most resources or opportunities that one enjoys are the product of concatenated occurrences
involving both chance and choice. Thus, even were it easy, in a binary manner, to describe any
one choice simply as either freely made or forced, it nonetheless would be daunting to parse out,
say, some fraction f of one’s holdings attributable solely to her responsible choices and a
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complement 1– f of that fraction attributable simply to fortune. Add to this concern the fact that
it might be difficult or even impossible, owing to interpersonal utility-comparability and interitem commensurability difficulties of the sort flagged above at Part II.C and elaborated below at
Part III.C, to attach a specific dollar value to such portions for purposes of determining adequate
compensation for the exogenously underendowed, and it grows quickly unsurprising that there is
at least some degree of surface disagreement not just in the American, but in most political
traditions over who should own what.
Such difficulties should not, however, obscure the fact that there is broad agreement
within and among the American political traditions over the basic principles here stated. As
Americans, we are nearly if not fully unanimous in our belief that citizen-agents both should
enjoy equal opportunity and should be entitled to keep what they legitimately earn. Our
disagreements are, in significant if not in full measure, over the empirics of what actually is
earned.120 Immediately below I shall exploit that fact, on behalf of the American OS, in two
ways: First I shall specify some classes of holdings that we broadly agree to be both measurable
and ethically exogenous in the holding, and rest EEOR ownership prescriptions in part on that
range.121 And second, I shall sketch a Walrasian market mechanism, set in motion within that
range of agreement, which, by honoring citizens as agents and the EOP as allocation principle,
further addresses the measurement difficulties that are in large measure responsible for the
magnitude of the tracing problem as we currently find it.

C. Sidestepping the Boundary Dispute
This Subpart seeks to quarantine the boundary dispute. It does so by sidestepping the
tracing problem that has afflicted each of the three American political traditions and that
therefore threatens, by extension, our “core” tradition, the EEOR. Three intuitions guide the
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effort. Each one is manifest in its own Subsubpart to this Subpart. The first intuition is that
there is an overlapping consensus both within and among our three traditions not only that
ethically exogenous opportunity endowments should ideally be allocated equitably, but also that
several easily ascertained classes of readily measured endowment unambiguously qualify as
ethically exogenous. Bracketing the more difficult cases, we can move ahead together on the
ground that we share. The second intuition is that much of the magnitude of the tracing problem
is attributable not only to chance- and choice-melding opportunities that we can bracket pursuant
to the first intuition, but to three measurement difficulties that afflict efforts to quantify and
compare, in an ethically salient way, disparate holdings of all of the heterogeneous benefits and
burdens that can be held by separate persons in the EEOR. A market mechanism well known to
economists of fairness but oddly ignored by economically oriented members of the legal
academy thus far, I claim, enables us to sidestep those measurement difficulties not sidestepped
by the first, bracketing strategy. It thereby enables us substantially to diminish the magnitude of
the tracing problem. The third intuition is somewhat more technical in the vindicating, but is
vindicated nonetheless in Subparts C.3 and D. It is that the ordered set of “second best” markets
falling short in their completeness and neutrality of the ideal (“first best”) market sketched in
Subpart C.2, is ordinally equivalent to the ordered set of “second best” opportunity allocations
falling short in their fairness and efficiency of that ideal (“first best”) market. The upshot is that
even incomplete progress in the direction here advocated is ethically appreciable progress.

1. Core Opportunity-Endowments
Here I begin the process of sidestepping the boundary dispute and thus moving farther
away from ambivalence, and closer to univocality, on the matter equal opportunity. I list and
briefly characterize four classes of basic opportunity endowment that all or nearly all Americans,
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whether they consider themselves adherents primarily of the CR, CL or PC traditions, are likely
to agree to be ethically exogenous in the holding.
The first such class is that of opportunities for early education. Agent-citizens begin their
lives as children. The younger a child, the less responsible she is for her opportunities to learn,
to develop her capacities to learn and do more, and to develop a sense of control over and
responsibility for her own future. As a matter of unadulterated principle, such opportunity
should be equitably enjoyed by all children. Inequalities of such opportunity are to be deplored
or regretted, and so far as possible to be mitigated or eliminated. If San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez122 was correctly decided as a matter of law, then the “law” applied
there is not in keeping with American values. And if some parents believe that they bear a
fundamental right to seek to advantage their children over others, then they are mistakenly
interpreting fundamental right as not conferring equal agency rights upon either those other
children or even their own.123 Their preferences are preferences for externalities, for wrongs,
and are inconsistent with the American tradition of responsible liberty. This is not to say that
equity need – or even ought – to – be sought by “leveling down”. Rather, the guiding idea
should be to maximize the level of provision that is providable to all.124
The second class of exogenous opportunity endowment comprises genetic determinants,
in so far as we are able to determine them, of successful life-planning, wealth-making and
happiness-pursuit. Such determinants include all – but only – such aspects of basic human health
and functioning as are not attributable to decisions for which we reasonably hold ourselves and
others accountable. Birth with a handicap or predisposition to debilitating illness warrants
everybody’s chipping-in to mitigate such handicaps’ or illnesses’ debilitating effects.125
Debilitation wrought by smoking, drunken driving, etc., does not – though of course it may elicit
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charitably provided assistance. This is not to advocate a “rescue policy” – another instance of
“leveling down” – whereby all must sacrifice everything to attempt futilely to compensate
“100%” those born severely underendowed, any more than the EOP dictates “leveling down” in
connection with fair access to educational opportunity.126 The amount with which to address
such disadvantage should reflect the aggregated and averaged social valuation of contingent
claims payable to self-insurers against such disadvantage; such is the amount entailed by our
agency. That valuation in turn is determined either by simulating or by actually providing
markets in such claims that bear the features laid out in Part III.C.2, markets in which uncertainty
about such handicaps’ emergence in effect is shared.127 For present purposes the point is
simpler. It is simply that the American tradition of equal opportunity regards these resources as
ethically exogenous. And the advance of medical knowledge can be expected to grant greater
clarity as to which of our infirmities, and to what degree, are beyond control.128
Health, basic functional capacity and education can be regarded as elements of “human
capital.”129 Equalizing early educational and basic health endowments is equalizing access to
ethically exogenous human capital. A third range of broad American agreement as to what is
ethically exogenous can be characterized as access to non-human capital. We can think of the
right to equal access to such capital as the equal right to capitalize upon one’s own diligence, an
equal right to wealth-creating opportunity.130 An equal right to wealth-creating opportunity, to
work diligently in satisfying others’ wants and to profit thereby, is, trivially, a right to productive
capital. Human capital is of course productive in the requisite sense; that is the sense in which it
is “capital.” But it is doubtful that individually held human capital constitutes the principal
portion of capital with which individual agents produce and profit.131 Access to ownership of or
participation in firms and networks – the varyingly integrated institutional arrangements in which
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productive synergies of pooled and organized human and nonhuman capital result in wealthproduction – surely is at least as important.132
It is potentially more difficult to trace out the ethically exogenous and ethically
endogenous elements of non-human than human capital holdings. For, unlike genetic
endowments and early education, most non-human capital holdings are held by adults, and adults
have lived and acted long enough for both responsible choice and non-responsible circumstance
to concatenate and intermeld over time. Nevertheless, there are some elements of non-human
capital holding that all can agree to be attributable to fortune not effort. Large non-human
capital inheritances or bequests are an obvious example. They are non-human capital
counterparts to genetic endowments. Moreover, to recognize that many large holdings of nonhuman capital are attributable to luck in the birth lottery need not commit us to attitudes of envy
or even to plans of confiscation.133 We can view the recognition instead as minimally
committing us to channeling newly discovered, opened or openable pools of capital toward those
who have not been born to large holdings already. Examples here would include, among others,
newly usable segments of the electromagnetic spectrum, minerals found on the seabed or under
public – even some private – lands, new resources eventually found off of the earth through
publicly financed space exploration, and, once again closer to home, new social cost-saving and
wealth-creating opportunities opened through the public facilitation of new forms of insurance
against risks that antecedently impede enterprise- and wealth-development. Such opportunities
are counterparts to the “new” resources distributed widely and equitably to the previously less
resourced by, e.g., the Homestead Act and the National Housing Act.134 The sequel to this
Article elaborates on these and other precedents, some actually implemented others thus far but
proposed. Part IV foreshadows that tactic by designing policy strategies that capitalize upon
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endowment heuristics – in particular, our greater willingness to channel perceivedly “new”
exogenous resources to the exogenously underendowed than to redistribute accumulated
resources from the exogenously overendowed.
The fourth and final category of opportunity/resource that we all can agree to be ethically
exogenous is the opportunity to share ethically exogenous risk – a manner of “backhanded,” or
“negative” benefit. The idea here is that some misfortunes which strike after birth and that are
not reasonably foreseeable during adulthood are misfortunes for which the victims are not
responsible. Such misfortunes are regarded, under the EOP, as joint misfortunes, at least until
there is opportunity for equally exogenously endowed agents voluntarily to trade their shares of
such misfortunes in keeping with their differential disvaluations of them – or the differential
valuations, ex ante, of claims to compensation contingent upon their occurrence. The intuition
finds expression in the venerable American tradition of the neighbors’ sharing, before the
widespread availability of farmers’ insurance, in “barn-raising” for one among them whose farm
has been struck by lightning.
Such “all chip in” arrangements, it has been well observed, are in the nature of
rudimentary insurance arrangements.135 And a more fully developed and fine-grained insurance
arrangement will reflect different participants’ differing valuations of the varying compensations
that might be afforded in return for varying insurance contracts incorporating varying riskassessments and varying premia-exactions. Collective political action to distribute riskmitigation opportunity in keeping with the EOP in the present day, then, ought ideally to
facilitate the development of actual or simulated markets in such risk.136 But in doing so it must
also, of course, impose or simulate ethically exogenous informational symmetry – fairness –
among market participants. Such information – that which cannot be had simply by exercise of
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diligence – is itself part of the ethically exogenous endowment that the EOP recommends be
equitably shared.137 Under these circumstances assessments and payouts will reflect, in effect,
the averaged social valuation of the risks and payouts in which valuation process each citizenagent has exercised an equal “vote.”
Among the core endowments just discussed, human capital presents least in the way of
theoretic and practical intractability, at least where early education and unambiguously genetic
incapacity are the focus. The non-human capital and risk-trading, as well as later education and
mixed genetic-and-behavioral health outcomes, present somewhat more challenge in view of
their involving adults, who have lived long enough to mix responsible choice with nonresponsible circumstance in arriving at their present endowments. But we nonetheless can agree
over portions even of these latter endowments which involve only non-responsible circumstance
– e.g., inherited non-human capital or entirely unforeseeable accident. And we can expect
advances in the medical sciences, particularly now that the human genome is mapped, to enable
us to assign weights to comparative chance and choice factors in debility. The same can be said
of other forms of chance disadvantage which the physical sciences and refined statistical
techniques increasingly will enable us to foresee and thus both head-off and attribute to the
information accounts of our citizens.138 And we likely shall be able to do so with no less
precision than is attained even today in, for example, comparative fault determinations in
courtrooms.
In so far as we work to equalize core endowments, we advance the cause of our own
American EOP. We also facilitate the creation and operation of that complete and neutral market
described in the next Subpart, which further diminishes the tracing problem and thus enables our
opportunity-equalizing efforts to yield a “multiplier effect” in realizing the EOP and advancing
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the cause of responsible agency. Such is the rough, practical goal that we all can agree to be in
furtherance of the political-ethical consequences of our American commitment to equal
opportunity.

2. Market, Measurement & Distribution Mechanism
The next step in our quest for univocality is to specify means of diminishing
measurement difficulties that exacerbate the tracing problem, while doing justice to the EEOR’s
understanding of citizens and material opportunities. This Subpart accordingly describes an
opportunity-allocation mechanism, readily constructible in theory and approximable in practice,
by which to do so. We’ll see in the next Subpart that the mechanism realizes the only ethically
cognizable form of “efficiency” as well. It therefore serves as an engine for realizing a truly
efficient, equal-opportunity republic.
Begin by distinguishing three measurement challenges that historically have constrained
answers to the constitutive questions raised by the EEOR-valued “variables” enumerated at the
beginning of this Part. Those questions, again, were the questions who is to own, what is to be
owned, and according to what basic principles such ownable things should be allocated. For the
generic purposes of this Subpart, which require that we consider what agents disvalue as well as
what they value,139 call that which is owned a desired “distribuendum” (plural “distribuenda”).
Call the principles according to which such things are to be owned “distribution principles.”
(Our owners, recall, are responsible citizen-agents.) The American EEOR tradition views
resources and opportunities as the appropriate desired distribuenda, and the EOP as the
appropriate distribution principle. But it has not always been agreed that these should be the
values filling those variables. And the reason is measurement. Three distinct measurement
concerns historically have influenced at least CL’s and PC’s treatments of appropriate
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distribuenda and distribution principles. Call them the simple quantifiability, interpersonal
comparability, and commensurability concerns.140
Simple quantifiability historically has stood in the way of settlement, in the CL and PC
traditions, upon mutually agreeable distribuenda and distribution principles in the following way:
On the one hand, resource, opportunity and the like are not intelligible as such apart from some
person’s actual or idealized preference for or valuation of these items – hence, apart from the
items’ yielding some manner of “satisfaction,” “value,” “happiness,” “utility,” “welfare” or
“well-being,” conceived in some suitable manner, to the person who values them. Resources and
opportunities must, that is to say, be understood as resources or opportunities for something, and
for someone. To suppose otherwise is, in effect, to fetishize the distribuendum and render
mysterious why citizen-agents, hence the polity, would or should be concerned with its
ownership or distribution at all.141
On the other hand, these latter states – welfare, utility, happiness, etc. – as noted at Part
I.C, do not lend themselves to cardinal measurement in the attainment, certainly not as a
practical, and perhaps not even as a conceptual matter. Relatedly, they cannot be, so far as we
appear to have reason to suppose, directly distributed to anyone. They are experienced only as
subjective outputs of utility functions the inputs to which must be some objective item or items,
rather than some subjective state or states.142 And while these objective inputs – resources or
material opportunities – are, by and large, cardinally quantifiable, so long as the outputs that
render them ethically significant are not it is difficult – even for a Utilitarian who views the
utility-yield as the only relevant factor – to determine how much of any of them anyone ethically
ought to have.
What is more – and now we move from Utilitarianism to more responsibility-concerned
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CR and CL – bounded agents are in part responsible for, and in part not responsible for, their
own utility functions. One can be innately more difficult to satisfy than others, but one can also
in a manner choose to be more difficult – or expensive – to satisfy than others.143 So the
difficulty of cardinally measuring happiness intractably afflicts the already, independently
difficult task of separately tracing the ethically endogenous (responsible) and the ethically
exogenous (non-responsible) grounds of one’s utility function – of one’s translating objective
inputs into subjective outputs.
Now consider the interpersonal comparability problem. Even were welfare cardinally
quantifiable as a state of any given person, it is unclear whether it would be interpersonally
comparable as a state-type enjoyed among multiple persons. For there can appear to be,
intuitively, something radically distinct as between P1’s happiness and P2’s happiness,
presumably owing in some manner to there seeming to be something radically separate, distinct,
or unique about every sentient being’s subjectivity, or consciousness, itself.144 One might
reasonably feel hesitant, that is to say, about declaring P1 to be “as happy” as P2 even were one
able, say by analogy to the operation of a pool of mercury in a capillary tube, to associate
happiness with quanta of endorphins in P1’s or P2’s bloodstream and assign cardinal measures to
P1’s or P2’s individual states of happiness. And this problem is not solved simply by moving to
“objective” wealth, from “subjective” welfare, as distribuendum. For again, it is only the
welfare-yield that renders wealth ethically intelligible as “wealth” rather than inert, insipid
matter in the first place.145 And differing persons, both responsibly in part and accidentally in
part, can derive differing degrees of welfare from the same material items.
Now the commensuration problem: The fact that there are multiple material inputs – call
them benefits and burdens for present purposes – that appear differentially to affect utility and
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disutility, coupled with the difficulty attending cardinally measuring the utility and disutility
afforded by such benefits and burdens, would render it difficult, even were interpersonal
comparability somehow unproblematic, to determine how much of benefit B1 would compensate
P1 for a shortage of, say, B2 relative to person P2. Unless the appropriate distribution formula
were to mandate a distinct distribution of each good and ill over all agent-citizens independent of
the distribution of the other goods and ills – a seemingly implausible suggestion146 – we require
“rates of exchange” between goods and ills themselves in order to derive a numéraire or index
suitable to determining how much “good-or-ill-stuff in total” any citizen holds. But since utility
or happiness-yield is the touchstone of some objective item’s beneficial or burdensome status to
an agent, and since as we have observed said utility or happiness-yield is problematic in the
measurement, it is not clear how we are to commensurate disparate benefits and burdens in a
manner pertinent to distributive propriety. Our would-be numéraire – happiness-yield – is itself
cardinally non-quantifiable.
Happily, however, as noted before there is one mechanism which simultaneously solves –
or, better, circumvents – all three measurement problems. And it does so while – indeed, by –
doing justice to the three constitutive values assigned by our synthesized EEOR political selfunderstanding to the three ownership-pertinent “variables” (viz., again, responsible citizenagents, all benefits and burdens adjudged as such by such agents, EOP-consistent allocation).
The same mechanism addresses, at least in part, the problem posed by bounded agents’ being
responsible in part, while not in whole, for their own utility functions. To the degree that we can
realize this mechanism “on the ground,” then, we can simultaneously realize the EEOR and
facilitate the principal measure-theoretic problems’ “taking care of themselves,” so to speak.
And in so doing we diminish the tracing problem and largely sidestep the boundary dispute.
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Here, in idealized form, is the mechanism: Assume a “complete” market – a forum in
which all and only desired, voluntary trading occurs.147 Assume that that trading is in, first, all
goods and services that can practically be made available and that anyone values – hence, that
are politically cognizable as ethically interesting distribuenda. Assume that the trading is in,
second, contingent claims to compensation upon the occurrence of any eventuality that anyone
disvalues, payable by anyone willing to take the opposite sides of these, what amount to cautious
“bets,” on the disvalued contingencies. Assume further that this market is “neutral.” It is neutral
in the sense, first, that each participant enters it with an ethically exogenous initial endowment of
– largely in the nature of ownership rights to – ethically exogenous desired assets equal to that
with which everyone else enters it. It is neutral in the sense, second, that regulatory norms
effectively prevent such collusively, strategically or expropriatively opportunistic behaviors as
would effectively result in some participants’ coming to possess greater or lesser holdings or
“price-affecting effective demand powers” than would be traceable to such ethically exogenous
initial endowments and their ethically endogenous transaction histories alone.148 This
mechanism strait-forwardly instantiates in broad outline the ownership régime prescribed by our
synthesized American EEOR tradition. It satisfies the prescriptions entailed by the three aboveoffered fillings-in of the ownership-pertinent “variables,” and simultaneously addresses the three
critical measurement concerns. Here, more precisely, is how:
The mechanism honors citizen-participants as responsible agents. They transact
voluntarily pursuant to their own, autonomous relative valuations of items and contingencies that
they prefer and disprefer in keeping with their pursuits of happiness. The mechanism treats as
distribuenda what ever goods or services – which latter include risk-bearing services – those
agents themselves value or disvalue. Those goods and services are the material resources or
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opportunities from which citizen-agents’ utilities, happinesses or lifeplan-satisfactions derive.
And the mechanism, via the neutrality imposed upon it at the outset and retained throughout,
equalizes what is ethically exogenous – that which is not traceable in the holding directly to a
responsible choice – while allowing holdings over time nonetheless to vary with ethically
endogenous responsible transactional decisions. Holdings at time Tn, that is to say, are traceable
to equalized holdings at T0 and voluntary choices thereafter. 149
The mechanism sidesteps, in an ethically satisfactory way, the problem of cardinal
“happiness” or utility measurement. It does so by allowing citizen-agents, via voluntary trading
activity, presumptively – by dint of the “first fundamental theorem of welfare economics”150 – to
“maximize” utility in a manner consistent with (a) ethically exogenous endowment equality
among market participants, and (b) consequently equally shared scarcity of the exogenously
given resources from which agents “produce” their own utility.151 It does not matter for OS
purposes, that is to say, what sort of number – cardinal or ordinal – that we might assign to
citizens’ happinesses or utilities, or whether or how we manage to scale such numbers, so long as
we know that the utilities are the “highest” possible consistent with the correct distribution
principle – the EOP – and the consequently equally shouldered, exogenously given constraints
posed by the material environment.
Similarly, the mechanism – again unobjectionably – sidesteps the problem of
interpersonal happiness or utility comparison. For, so long as the resource-components – i.e., the
ethically exogenous components – of “utility-manufacture” or “happiness-pursuit” itself –
endorphins, C-fibers, what ever (sometimes called “personal,” or “internal” resources) – are
themselves counted – in the form of drugs, supplements, or contingent claims to compensation –
among the exogenous endowments that must be equalized over participants, then again, what
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ever the absolute or comparative quanta of happiness or utility enjoyed by citizens, we shall
know that these are the “highest” that they can be consistent with the appropriate distribution
principle – again, the EOP – and the consequently equally shouldered constraints posed by the
exogenously given environment.
Finally, the mechanism “automatically,” as it were commensurates distribuenda in the
only way that ethically matters, via the autonomous implicit comparative valuations of
autonomously transacting citizen-agents.152 We need not worry ourselves over how much of B2
“would” or will compensate P1 for a deficit of B1, let alone construct a “perfectionist” index of
all goods and ills.153 Our citizen-participants themselves will, in effect, autonomously and with
equal voice construct the index – a spontaneously emergent price index – which amounts to an
aggregated comparative “social” valuation of goods and ills, in the construction of which each
participant has exercised an equal “vote.”154 (Again, provided that there exists market
completeness and neutrality in the senses explicated above.) And so yet again, in a manner that
reflects the constraints both of relative environmental scarcities and of the appropriate
distribution principle – equal allocation of all and only that which is ethically exogenous – we
find the mechanism allowing the measurement question to “take care of itself” to precisely the
degree that the EEOR itself demands that care be taken at all.

3. Measuring the Core Endowments & Realizing the Market
The mechanism, then, in so far as it can be realized – in part, precisely by equalizing the
core opportunity-endowments enumerated in III.C.1 over its participants – simultaneously
assists in realizing the EEOR that forms the three tradition-synthesizing, theoretic basis of the
American OS and in large part quarantines the tracing problem. Three challenges, however,

Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

44

might appear to stand in the way of that realization. Here I note and dispel them.
The first challenge is the matter of equalizing the aforelisted core endowments. If we
have to equalize holdings of those, it might be thought we have to commensurate them. But how
are we to do that prior to the operation of the equal-endowment grounded market mechanism,
when it is that mechanism itself that affords ethically satisfactory commensuration – i.e., social
valuation pursuant to a process in which each citizen bears an “equal vote” by dint of her
entering that market with an equal initial endowment? Market neutrality might be rendered selfperpetuating once attained, but how is it to be attained when the market itself affords the measure
of market-antecedent neutrality?
Were we able to “start all over,” of course, this problem would be diminished. We would
simply give each citizen an equal allotment of coupons with which to bid on unowned
resources.155 But of course we are not able to start all over, and significant portions of what each
of us already owns presumably are traceable, in theory, at least in part to our ethically
endogenous efforts. Nonetheless, there is a plausible “second best” solution at hand. First, note
that the core endowments enumerated at III.C.1 are limited in number, relatively easily
quantified and equitably distributed, and in little need of commensuration. If we distinguish
between “beneficial” and “burdensome” core assets, we see that this is particularly so of the
beneficial ones – early education and inherited non-human capital. The burdensome ones, by
contrast, are a bit more difficult, since they include “internal resources,” but still far from
impossible. The hardest one is genetically poor health or handicap. Some such deficiencies can
themselves be valued by reference to current prices affixed to their mitigation – prostheses,
medicines, etc. There seems no harm in beginning to address such deficits with compensation
equal to the going rates. Other such deficits are not so readily mitigated. There the best that we
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can do is estimate the compensation that would be afforded by insurance policies that typically
are or “would” be purchased against such contingencies if such are or were available.156 Clearly
there’s more guesswork here, but it need not be an arbitrary whistling in the dark. We do the
best we can to repair the ship at sea. The more repairing that we do, the better able the
mechanism will grow to fix itself.
The second challenge is rooted in “completeness” as the first was rooted in “neutrality”.
It is this: Is it reasonable to require that “all and only desired trading” occur? Is that possible,
and do we even want it? Wouldn’t we have to abandon our market-inalienability norms and
“commodify” everything?157 And if we don’t do that, can the mechanism do what has been
charged to it?
This challenge is more easily addressed than that directed to neutrality. Again we look
first to the core opportunity endowments of Part III.C.1. All of these are subject, in principle, to
unobjectionable market-valuability already. Next we consider what else might be traded – “all
that enters into agents’ happiness-pursuit”. It is easy enough simply to bracket out of market
transactions such things as we should not wish to see commodified – babies or organs, for
example.158 There will of course be disagreement as to some of these. It might appear to be an
affront to liberty, for example, to prohibit autonomous agents’ trading in what ever they wish to
trade, at least when the trading really is consensual and uninfected by objectionable inequities in
comparative bargaining power, and does not itself impinge upon any third party’s equal liberty.
It might especially seem so against a more equitably spread opportunity backdrop, before which
implicit exploitation fears are less likely to be operative. But the real point here is that we need
not worry over these disputes at the margins of commodifiability. The mechanism does its work
quite well through trade of those many more goods and services that all agree ought to be
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tradable.
That’s the desirability side of this challenge. The feasibility side comes in the
transaction- and information-cost barriers to market-completion in the technical sense. Is it
really reasonable to suppose that all parcelings of ownable and tradable goods, and that paymentclaims defined in terms of all specifiable contingencies, can be tradable?159 Here the problem,
the guise of which is more technical than the alienability guise, can be handled in two ways. The
first way is to note that it is by now a well established theorem of general equilibrium- and
stochastic calculus-rooted financial theory that complete markets can be simulated through a
comparatively small number of hedging strategies.160 That fact is exploited in the present
Article’s more programmatic sequel, as well as in a predecessor article devoted to the subject of
proposed global hedging markets.161 The second way is more immediately satisfying. It is to
note that the problem has no real “bite” here, for as the answer to the third challenge shows,
more complete and more neutral always means more consistent with the EEOR’s constitutive
values. There is, that is, an ordered set of “second bests” that is ordinally equivalent to the set of
“more” complete and “more” neutral markets. So all we have to do is to move further – as far as
we are able – in the right direction to become the best that we can be.
The third challenge, just presaged, is this: If you cannot achieve full completeness and
neutrality of the sort that characterizes the mechanism that assists in realizing the EEOR, might it
be that seeking more completeness and more neutrality than you presently have could, ironically,
take you farther from the ideal goal? Hasn’t Hart, for example, proved that such might be the
case at least in respect of completeness?162 I’ll reply here intuitively, reserving technical
treatment for another venue. The intuitive reply is that the claim that there is no second best
trades on an ethically uninteresting conception of efficiency. The only politically cognizable
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conception of efficiency, by contrast, is one in respect of which it happens that any forward
movement on the completeness or neutrality fronts results in forward movement on the only
ethically intelligible “welfare” front. I complete the argument in the next Subpart, for it is best
made in connection with a fuller treatment of the other value that is constitutive of our EEOR,
efficiency.

D. Equal Opportunity as Efficiency
Parts III.A & B established, respectively, that CR and CL are committed, with differing
degrees of explicitness, to the conception of citizens as responsible agents and of appropriate
ownership as ownership consistent with the EOP. PC, in turn, was shown not to be committed to
the contrary of either of those propositions. Part I.C, for its part, established that PC does
commit itself more or less explicitly to two other propositions: First, that public policies ought
generally either to promote or at least not to offend fairness. And second, that such policies
ought generally either to promote, or not unnecessarily to inhibit, “efficiency” or economic
“growth.” Part I.C also noted that these two desiderata can appear, superficially, in some
circumstances to be at odds. And it noted that CR and CL for their parts do not, at least on the
surface, take positions contrary to the PC rules of thumb. This Subpart shows that PC fairness
and efficiency, non-superficially understood, are not at odds. Moreover, PC fairness properly
construed is a rule of thumb to which CR and CL themselves are committed by dint of their
commitment to the EOP. And efficiency properly understood is a material entailment of success
in the pursuit of fairness properly understood. One upshot is that CR, CL and PC readily reduce
to one political understanding – our EEOR – at least where ownership is concerned. Another
upshot is that ordered sets of variably complete and neutral markets, and the ordered set of
variably efficient markets, are ordinally equivalent.
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First, CR and CL are committed to PC fairness. “Fairness,” both in its everyday
connotation and in its denotation of the salient attributes of “fairness-promoting” PC legislation,
means impartiality or even-handedness. To render circumstances fair is to “level the playing
field,” to remove barriers that people face through no fault of their own. Common synonyms of
“fair” in this sense are “equitable,” “just,” “equivalent,” and so on.163 But “fairness” in this
sense, then, means nothing more and nothing less than conformity with the equal opportunity
principle. To treat parties impartially is to treat them as equals for purposes of the treatment –
i.e., to eliminate inequities that are exogenous to the purposes of the treatment. And to be evenhanded with people is to treat them impartially.
Second, fairness in the equal opportunity sense is efficient in the only sense in which
“efficiency” bears ethical significance. The argument here bears both a negative and a positive
aspect. First we’ll explicate the term “efficiency,” then we’ll consider the negative and positive
sides of the argument that efficiency on any understanding, if stripped of fairness considerations,
is ethically uninteresting.
“Efficiency,” in the everyday sense of the word, connotes the maximization of output
given a stipulated input, or the minimization of input given a stipulated output. It means “more”
for “less”. The more technical understandings of “efficiency” familiar to welfare economists are
reducible to variations on that theme. Pareto-efficient distributions of goods or ills to persons are
best understood, intuitively, as distributions the aggregate utility deriving from which cannot be
raised without lowering the individual utility of at least one person.164 Pareto efficiency is
utility-maximization as constrained by, thus consistent with, the “veto” power wielded by anyone
who stands to suffer a utility loss in the event of some departure from some status quo. It is this
intuition, at any rate, that renders the Pareto criterion ethically salient. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
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is yet closer to the workaday understanding of “efficiency”. Distributions are efficient in the
Kaldor-Hicks sense if there is no departure from them that would render some parties’
aggregated gains greater than other parties’ aggregated losses.165 The guiding intuition, then,
again is that the welfare output of a given distributive input is, given the welfare functions that
we have to work with, the “highest” that it can be.166
Now efficiency on any of these understandings is normatively uninteresting unless it is
understood by irreducible reference to fairness. This is absolutely crucial, yet surprisingly oftignored. First, from the “negative” side, it is well established – though still, mysteriously,
insufficiently observed – that mere maximization of an aggregate, be it of welfare or of wealth,
shorn of attention paid the fairness of the means by which that aggregate is maximized is
fetishism.167 The claim here is not that maximization shorn of fairness is not good enough. It is
that it is not good at all; it is not so much as cognizable as “good”. Nobody – CR, CL, PC or
otherwise – would maintain that to render all save one inhabitant of the world miserable in order
to render that one remaining inhabitant, possessed of an eccentric utility function, so ecstatically
happy as to exceed the aggregated happiness of all others under some other distribution, would
be to “maximize” anything cognizable to normative concern.168 To do so would be ethically on
all fours with an argument that all public policy should be framed with a view to maximizing the
amount of blue-colored surface space in the universe. It just is not “good,” in any sense, to
enlarge something that has nothing to do with anybody’s equal moral agency. Wealth and
welfare, then, must be understood by reference to principles of fair opportunity to engage in
wealth- or welfare-creation before they can be intelligible as values at all. They are “wealth” or
“welfare,” as distinguished from a large endorphin count or a vast blue-colored surface space –
an insipid and lifeless material substance – only in so far as such is the case.169
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Second, from the “positive” side, recall that the EOP requires not only that ethically
exogenous holdings of that from which satisfactions are derived – opportunities – be equalized,
but also that ethically endogenous such holdings are permitted to vary with responsible effort.
But this means that “satisfaction,” “welfare,” or “wealth” will be “maximized” in the only
ethically intelligible sense of those words precisely in so far as the inputs of “satisfactionfunctions” are distributed in accordance with the equal opportunity principle. Agent-citizens are
permitted to, and face all incentive to, “produce” and indeed “maximize” their own satisfactions
under the EOP, which requires that they be permitted to retain that which they produce by their
own efforts out of exogenously given resources. So “aggregate” satisfaction will be
“maximized” in the only sense in which satisfaction-maximization is ethically noteworthy.
Every agent’s satisfaction will be the highest that it can be consistent with the EOP. That is all
that is intelligible as “efficient” where it is satisfaction that would be efficiently or inefficiently
“produced”. Ethically intelligible efficiency just is what results from distribution of happinessinputs in accordance with the EOP.
Once we see this, we see that the third challenge raised to Part III.C.2 is dissipated.
Proofs that sets of markets which are rank-ordered in terms of degrees of completeness falling
short of full completeness are not ordinally equivalent to sets of markets rank-ordered in terms of
their welfare-optimality trade on a conception of welfare-optimality that is ethically
uninteresting. The only welfare that matters – indeed, that can be viewed as well-faring (by
agents capable of faring well) rather than inert substance-growing – is that produced by equally
exogenously endowed agents who consume or trade that with which they are endowed and/or
that which they receive through trading when they are so endowed. There is no reason to
suppose that offering more such trading opportunities to all, or effecting greater equity among
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the holdings of ethically exogenous opportunities to all, would result in any ethically interesting
diminution of the happiness of any.170 Formal proof can be had elsewhere. I trust that for the
present the intuition is clear enough.

E. The Efficient Equal-Opportunity Republic is the Template of Our “Ownership Society”
It should be at least roughly apparent already that the EEOR which is our American
political self-understanding is, in effect, some kind of OS. Independent and responsible citizens,
as agents whose autonomy in fashioning their lives and pursuing happiness with exogenous
opportunities and resources is to be honored, are owners. They own their own lives, so to speak,
in that they hold exclusive rights to control and develop those lives, as consistent with the equal
such self-owning rights of others.171 And those agents must be recognized to own – rightfully to
control the disposition of – the material correlates of, the opportunities and resources that go into
building, those lives as well. The fruits of those resource and opportunity inputs, in turn – what
we have called the ethically endogenous element – also must be owned. Such are what our
agent-citizens bring to, and take from, the idealized market sketched above. All of these are
entailments of the construal of citizens as responsible agents whose holdings can be ethically
assessed in keeping with the EOP.
But this is of course only to begin to explicate the sense in which the EEOR is an OS.
For ownership is more than holding and controlling. It is psychologically experienced, and
legally protected, holding and controlling. And there are many differing forms and gradations –
many variations on the themes of – holding and controlling, and experiencing and legally
vindicating such holding controlling, in American psychology and law. Putting flesh on the
bare-bones of ownership in an American OS, then, requires more than simply saying that
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ownership and what is owned are to be understood by reference to responsible agency, efficiency
and equal opportunity. Those are the broad features of our ownership society. Filling-in the
more specific details requires that we take into account both the more detailed material
entailments of those conceptions, and the “path-dependent” features of American sensibility and
law themselves.

IV. OWNING AT THE CORE: ASSETS, OPTIONS & ENDOWMENTS IN THE EFFICIENT EQUALOPPORTUNITY REPUBLIC
Part III of this Article might be said to constitute the theoretic “engine” meant to drive
concerted and coherent effort toward an American OS. Part II supplied that engine’s parts,
showing that the engine’s content is domestic, so to speak. The sequel to this Article provides
the “wheels” which get that OS “rolling” on the ground. If these similes are fair, then this Part
might be called the “clutch” or “drive” through which the theory must specifically engage with
what it ultimately recommends. The law of ownership and the psychology of owners mediate
between articulated policy and effectively implemented program. They thus require care in their
own right if an OS is realistically to be instantiated. This Part is intended to supply that care. It
translates the Part III notion of a “resource” or “material opportunity” into a legally and
psychologically cognizable “asset” whose “ownership” is defined, delimited and vindicated by
an “ownership society” of responsible agents who cooperatively promote and protect their free
pursuits of happiness through the rule of law.
Three particularly noteworthy upshots emerge below. The first is that many more items,
abstract and concrete, can in principle and should be legally cognized as “assets” and ownable in
the contemporary American OS than could have been in an earlier CR, CL or PC polity. Call
this the “abstraction effect”. It yields both (a) specific consequences pertinent to policy, and (b)
additional political salience to the market mechanism sketched above in Part III.C. The second
noteworthy upshot is that in view of the much broader range of resources that should count as
assets in the contemporary American OS, assets’ autonomy-conferring attributes are in
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significant and complex measure dependent upon both the independent tastes and the cooperative
action of agents other than the agent who holds the asset in question. That too yields additional
political salience to the market mechanism sketched in Part III.C, and bears consequences for the
delineation of responsible ownership below at IV.B. The third noteworthy upshot is that there is
a real, practical distinction to be drawn between perceivedly “hard-owned” and “accumulated”
assets on the one hand, “merely entitled,” “income”-streams on the other. That distinction, of
course, does not register at the higher level of theoretical abstraction encountered in orthodox
financial economics, and thus might well surprise practitioners who practice solely in that
orthodox tradition. But the distinction will not surprise heuristics psychologists or theorists of
“behavioral” finance. And it likely will not surprise many lawyers. Indeed the distinction
appears to be rooted in the “endowment effect” and cognate heuristics familiar to behavioral
economists, thus to be rooted in the empirical psychologies of persons not just in the US, but in
other jurisdictions as well. In the US, however, the effect might also be grounded partly in the
doctrines and the path-dependence of American law, in this case constitutional and property law
– to pun a bit, a manner of “endowment effect” in its own right. Once again, this bears policy
and programmatic consequences that I shall attempt to trace.
Before elaborating upon these results, we must prepare the way by taking notice of
several broad parameters constraining legal ownership in any OS. “Ownership,” of course, is
more than mere possession, even if the latter really be “nine-tenths of the law”. An asset is
“owned” precisely to the degree that a society through its law vindicates the asset’s possession
and disposition. And “vindication,” of course, takes not only varying degrees, but varying
forms. The law, in turn, will be reflective of its enacting society’s constitutive “substantive”
values as to what rights and responsibilities its citizens hold for themselves and in relation to one
another. But the law also will reflect its society’s more “procedurally” oriented values as to how
the law should be fashioned, changed and enforced.
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The “substantive” guidance that the American EEOR’s core values afford to the law of an
American OS will ring familiar in light of Part III. “Ownership” of an “asset” should, for
purposes of delimitation and instantiation in keeping with the constitutive values of the EEOR,
conduce to citizen-agents’ or households of such agents’ capacities freely to make life-planning
or happiness-pursuing choices. They should conduce to citizen-agents’ capacities to make such
choices both independently and in keeping with the EOP, which latter equilibrates the
independence of all ethically equal agents. Owned assets should conduce to citizens’ capacities
to make such choices without undue subordination to the preferences of others, but not without
due regard for the equal agency rights of others. “Undue” subordination and “due” regard, of
course, are understood by reference to the EOP honored by the EEOR as described in Part III.
Once the sphere of legitimate independent agency is delimited in keeping with the equal
opportunity principle, an asset – an ownable resource – will be something the possession of
which realizes, enhances or secures that legitimate sphere of choice as a practical reality.
Those general substantive principles direct us toward a number of more particular,
“procedurally” oriented features of what should count as ownable assets in the American OS.
We draw those features out first by examining the variety of ways in which asset-holding
realizes practical autonomy. That is the focus of Subpart A, in which the stress is on liberty.
Subpart B then focuses upon autonomy’s delimitation by the EOP; the stress there is on that form
of liberty which is valued in the American OS – responsible liberty.

A. Ownership & Liberty
First, then, on liberty. We’ll begin with formal legal liberty – simple legally permissible
action – then see how asset-holding enhances the sphere of autonomy beyond mere legal
permissibility. For purposes of policy we’ll emphasize in particular how both the law and
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ownership-psychology appear to manifest the endowment heuristic familiar to theorists of
behavioral economics and behavioral finance. And we’ll draw some programmatic
consequences from this in anticipation of the sequel’s detailed blueprint of the full American OS.

1. In Theory & In Law
Begin with a simple hypothetical. Mr. A might as a formal legal matter is free to till or
not to till the soil of Ms. B, his neighbor. He might, that is, face no penalty imposed or
recognized by any formally constituted authority for not so tilling. He is not, legally, a chattel
slave or an indentured servant. If B is the only possible source from whom or which A might
acquire a basic livelihood – minimal caloric intake, shelter from the elements, etc. – however, he
will of course not as a practical matter be free not to work for B for food or shelter. He will not
“really,” or “pragmatically” be free. If by contrast A holds substantial livelihood-conferring
assets, he will not be practically required to till for B, though of course he might contract to do so
nonetheless for additional income. And presumably that will be for more income than he could
have held out for had he not held any livelihood-conferring assets other than his labor. An asset,
then, first and most simply is something that will practically widen an agent-citizen’s sphere of
politically or legally – “formally” – permitted choice. It will be a resource or material
opportunity, in Part III’s terms – the material correlate of agency itself. Ideally it will afford the
owner some degree of ongoing material self-sufficiency, by generating a continuous stream of
sustenance or “income.” It will prove useful to single out this latter quality – call it the
“fecundity” or “generativity,” perhaps the productivity, of an asset.
A’s right to his own labor in the previous example is itself an asset in as much as it
permits A at least to choose to work for B rather than to starve or steal. But A might also hold
more specialized or well developed talents – skills, or human capital, per the terms of III.C.1 – as
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well as other resources – e.g., land or nonhuman capital, savings, etc. In so far as, given
environmental, technological, cultural and market – hence, social – conditions, these enable A to
achieve a greater number of desired aims in a greater variety of ways, they too will be assets.
And they will augment A’s holding of that more basic and less generative asset that is just his
“unskilled” labor. Assets, then, clearly come in many shapes, and with varying degrees of
“assetness,” as conferrers of practical autonomy. And they seem to come in many more shapes
and gradations today than they did in the past. The modern EEOR or American OS is capable in
principle of affording its citizens a great deal more practical independence than the CR or the CL
polities of the past were able to afford.172
One distinctive quality of modern assets is that many of them provide the means of
generating not just income, as did assets in the past, but more assets – more “hard,” or
accumulated assets.173 Call this, echoing the penultimate paragraph up, the “generativity” of
some assets. In general, the more kinds or quantities of additional asset that a particular form of
asset can produce, the more “generative” it is. A machine tool, for example, used in the
production of other tools – a sort of “second order,” “ur-” or “meta-tool” – will in this sense be
more generative than a non-machine tool, at least if we hold the generated income constant.
Land, which ultimately yields many kinds of asset indeed, might be called the most generative of
– “the mother of all” – assets. But in light of possible market and liquidity restraints as well as
other factors we’ll discuss below, this thought must be ringed with caveats.
We can define “wealth” in the EEOR along the lines just sketched as either of two
magnitudes of assets. More kinds or qualities of assets translate into more wealth and so does a
greater quantity of any particular kind of asset. Wealth, then – the total of accumulated assets –
will by definition be the fungible or portative, as it were “fluidic,” material correlate of EEOR
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agency itself. More wealth means more options means more agency. And wealth that markets
or other mechanisms diffuse throughout the polity in keeping with the EOP is wealth that
realizes responsible agency.174
But there is more to be said about wealth: Wealth, at the level of abstraction adopted by
some economists, is either what can be expected with reasonable certainty in future to be, or is
already accumulated. At the lower level of abstraction employed by other economists, however,
a level which proves to be salient for OS purposes, wealth is only that which is – not what in
future might be – accumulated. Pursuant to the endowment effect and cognate heuristics
documented by experimental economists, wealth that one holds appears to be “worth” more than
wealth that one “might” or “will” hold.175 And that effect seems to be rooted in more than riskaversion or diminishing marginal utility.176 The distinction, as thus far stated, of course remains
very crude. For, like the behavioralists themselves, we’ve not yet defined “holding,” which in
turn we shall see to be inflected both by physical characteristics and by legal protection. We’ll
do that inflecting below. Suffice it for the moment simply to have flagged the broad distinction.
More accumulated wealth is more wealth.
There are two metrics additional – though nonetheless related – to the simple partativemagnitudinal along which wealth can vary that are of particular interest to citizens of the EEOR
or American OS: Wealth can be more or less secure, and it can be more or less liquid. The
former, we soon shall see, bears upon accumulation. The latter, “liquidity,” refers to the rapidity
with which an asset of one form can be transformed, through trading activity, into an asset of
another form – most commonly the “purest,” most abstract form of “pure purchasing power,”
money – without diminishing the rate of exchange at which it can be so transformed by dint of
the transformative transaction itself.177 The less liquid an asset is, the smaller the number of
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exchange transactions in which it can be employed within a given span of time, hence the more
restricted the sphere of choice opened by the asset to its owner. Greater liquidity means greater
disposability at greater rate of time and greater rate of exchange. And greater disposability at
greater such rates in effect means more asset, more choice. The more liquid an asset, then, the
more “generative,” in a sense, it will be. For liquidity is an asset’s capacity to bring – to
exchange for – other assets. It should be noted in this connection, however, that the relation
between liquidity and generativity entails that land and real estate are not always as generative as
they might be thought to be. They might be generative in their yields of additional resources that
spring from or are buried within them, while not being so generative of such resources as might
be, in a more liquid market, exchangeable for them. This proves significant to the sequel’s
treatment of “homesteading” and “capital homesteading”.
It is also salutary to note in this connection that the less “deep” or “thick” is the market
for a particular asset – that is, the fewer parties there are who desire and are willing to exchange
for the asset (hence, who regard it as an asset) – the less liquid (thus less generative) it will be.
We therefore find that the wealth represented by, or again as it were the “degree of assetness” of,
an asset – hence, the increment of autonomy that the asset confers – will generally ride in
significant measure upon the desires of persons other than the asset’s owner. And it will ride
upon other factors – legal, physical, etc. – that affect the rate of transformability of one asset into
another. Thus, although assets free one person partly from the wills of other individuals who
might “unduly” coerce her in the absence of her asset-owning, they do not free persons
altogether from the desires of those who make up the community. Rather, just as would have
been expected in view of the discussion at Part III, they conduce to responsible liberty – liberty
that takes account of the liberty of others – not unchecked libertinism.
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Turning from liquidity to security, the “security” of an asset refers to its durability and
reliability through time as an expander of choice for its owner.178 Security is therefore both a
legal and a physical-cum-financial category. The physical-financial aspect of security requires
little comment. An asset that rapidly depreciates is less “asset-like.” It confers less autonomy.
Along the physical-financial durability metric, then, land might again be thought the “mother of
all assets,” not only owing to its earlier noted generativity, but owing to its regenerativity or
value-retentivity. Real estate is one of the comparatively small number of assets which in most
localities does not unambiguously and inexorably depreciate, at least not for protracted periods,
but tends rather in most cases to appreciate over time.179 As will be discussed presently, it
happens that real estate and buried stores enjoy, at least within the American legal tradition, a
special form of legal security as well.
The legal aspect of assets’ security is more interesting and practically variable than the
physical. My assets are secure only to the extent, not merely that they do not rapidly depreciate,
but also to the extent that the law protects – and thus my fellow citizens protect – me from
uncompensated seizures.180 In so far as the law “entitles” me to possession and to disposition of
an asset, the latter is more secure, and thus more solidly or reliably “asset-like,” more valuable,
conferring of more wealth and more autonomy as the EEOR understands such terms. And of
course such entitlement, to be a practical rather than merely a formal reality, must be practically
vindicable and enforceable.
It of course cannot be said, in view of the foregoing, that entitlement is an all-or-nothing
affair – either as a practical or as a formal matter. The variability of legal security as a practical
matter is a function of that aforementioned vindicability and enforceability. The degree to which
the law secures the possession and disposition of assets as a formal matter is more complicated.
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To begin with, there is the familiar observation that legal ownership constitutes a “bundle of
rights.” The owner of property under American law generally, though not exceptionlessly, holds
the right to exclusive use and enjoyment thereof, to alienate the property freely, and to
considerable extent to subdivide it both spatially and temporally. On the one hand, bundling
bears directly upon choice and autonomy – more sticks, more choices – but the matter of
subdivision in particular reveals that the bundling of property rights is bound up also with
transformability and liquidity as discussed above.
In the civil law tradition, for example, where property types and relations are strictly
limited by the numerus clausus principle and unamendable by contract, entitlements are limited
to certain coarse-grained forms. One cannot easily, if at all, sell a “watch for a day” or a “halfownership of a home.”181 What we above called the “abstraction effect,” then, is by definition
less developed and less honored in such jurisdictions. Asset types are thereby limited, asset
markets therefore less complete, and autonomy – the sphere of choice – accordingly is limited as
well, at least in theory.182 In common law jurisdictions, where contract, property and tort are
more fluidic and thought to be more jointly vindicative and facilitative of private ordering, and
where assets therefore may be subdivided into more finely grained spatio-temporal “slices,”
assets are in principle more liquid, asset markets more complete, and choices and autonomy – as
well, therefore, at least in theory, as wealth and welfare – are for that reason greater.183 The legal
security of an asset’s liquidity itself, then, is in part a function of the legal system’s degree,
optimal or suboptimal, of flexibility or accommodatingness – the degree to which the law honors
the abstraction effect by recognizing, facilitating and protecting autonomous asset-delimiting and
exchange decisions and private ordering, consistent with the need to economize on information
costs.184 The same observation, duly modified, will hold of the law’s role in facilitating
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securitization and contingent claims transactions, more on which below.
We therefore see that law secures autonomy in at least two ways, both mediated through
the parceling of and transacting around assets: first, by protecting autonomy-enhancing assetownership itself; and second, by recognizing, facilitating and enforcing autonomously agreed
parcelings and delimitings of assets and transactions that derive in part from title to them. The
latter is not only to protect the choices involved in those parcelings and transactions themselves.
It is also to enhance or optimize asset-liquidity, which itself increases the degree to which assetownership enhances autonomy.185 The law, then, as public facilitation of private ordering
pursuant to the abstraction effect, can by optimizing the security and liquidity of asset-holding,
yet again be seen to amount to public action facilitative of private EEOR liberty. That, of course,
once again is how the EEOR itself, and hence the American OS, should be viewed – public
action in support of private liberty.
Beyond the abstraction effect – the legal bundling and parceling of entitlements – and
consequent liquidity considerations, the law’s formal securing of effective ownership must be
viewed along a simpler metric. This one might be called the basic “hardness” of entitlement, in
both property and contract form, within the doctrines and protections of the law. “Hardness,”
like the notions of “accumulation” and “wealth” mentioned above, is a rather open-ended and
elusive concept, bearing no distinct or singulary status in either legal or financial theory. But it
nonetheless appears to capture something now well documented in the literature of behavioral
and experimental economics. What we are after here is reminiscent of, though analytically
distinguishable from, both material durability and practical legal enforceability. It is the formal
legal analogue to these, and even reminiscent in a manner of liquidity (again). The fact is that
American law traditionally has recognized and protected some forms of property and other
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entitlements (e.g., contract rights) longer than, and continues to treat some as in a puzzling sense
“more fundamental” than, certain others. It also offers differing forms of protection – differing
forms and degrees of entitlement – with variable implications for autonomy. And these differing
forms and degrees appear both to reflect and to perpetuate certain psychological attitudes toward
these differing forms of entitlement.
A few examples familiar to lawyers help flesh the point out and give it concrete
expression. In a still celebrated article,186 Professor Reich suggested years ago that the welfare
state had ushered in a “new [form of] property” which should be recognized as such both in
order to maintain citizens’ independence from government and to vindicate constitutional values.
Entitlements conferred by statute, Reich argued, even if entitlements to nothing more than
conditional income-streams, were entitlements conferred by law. Such entitlements accordingly
warranted the status of property – protected by constitutional due process rights against stateexpropriation or encroachment. They were owned, just like anything else to which the law
attached title. The US Supreme Court of course soon agreed in large measure, in effect
constitutionalizing Reich’s argument in Goldberg v. Kelly.187 “Entitlement” could be like title.
Even in the Reich and Goldberg era, however, there were limits on the linkages between
the ownership of “older” and of “newer” property.188 Due process protected individuals against
capricious case-by-case denials by administrative bodies of legislatively conferred entitlements.
But it did not protect the entire class of such recipients from wholesale repeal of the entitling
program itself. Nor were welfare or social security checks, like title to land or other “old”
property, assignable.189 As if to underscore the point, all it took was a new appointment or two
to the Court and a few short months before the new property came once again to look like less
than property at all.190 Moreover, a few appointments more and another fifteen years saw even
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non-welfare check government entitlements looking less secure, while more traditional
entitlements grew even more secure than they had been in previous decades. The allusion here,
of course, is to Supreme Court justiciability doctrine since the later 1980s. It has almost come to
seem that only very “old” – traditional common law – property can actually be owned so far as
the federal courts are concerned.191 One might have thought that an Article III “case” would be
presented any time that a cause of action had accrued, that causes of action in turn accrued with
injuries, and that injuries in turn were defined by law – including, then, by statute. Yet by
requiring that a very special and ill-defined kind of injury – “concrete and particularized”192 – be
suffered before access could be had to the federal courts, the Supreme Court appears now to hold
that only those forms of injury, thus only those forms of right or entitlement cognizable in 1787,
can be vindicated in the federal courts today. In so far as this is the case, assets of long
American-legal pedigree – ideally, traceable to ancient common law vindicability – might be
expected to be more formal-legally secure than others. They are more “owned,” precisely
because they are more “concrete,” or “hard”.193
Another example is a bit less dramatic but no less important. In another celebrated article
a decade less venerable than Reich’s, Professors Calabresi and Melamed seminally distinguished
between “property rules” and “liability rules”.194 The distinction is drawn in terms of the form of
specific legal vindication afforded a legal entitlement. Property protection, of course, is such as
requires any taker of another’s entitlement to pay a price set by the holder. Liability protection is
such as requires the taker to pay a price determined by the law itself, broadly conceived – e.g., by
legal doctrine or by a trial court’s application of a broadly stated legal standard, which might but
need not incorporate a market’s valuation of the entitlement in question. Assets that are
“property,” in this sense, accordingly are more “asset-like” – conferring of more choice – than
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are assets, such as contractual rights, that are vindicated by “mere” liability rules. For they
permit the holder to determine price. But both, of course, are assets to a greater degree than are
“mere” government “entitlements” per Reich, at least legally speaking.195
A critical fact, in this connection, is that the law affords most protection – confers most
“assetness” – upon precisely those assets that we’ll see tend to be appreciated by holders as more
asset-like – “hard,” “accumulated” assets. Property rules, for example, typically protect holders
of physical or otherwise accumulated objects and capital, even though of course such objects
might be variously divided along spatio-temporal lines. Liability rules, in turn, protect rights to
performance – contract – or rights to be free of “performance” – tort. And due process rights, so
far as entitlement is concerned, at best protect rights to be free of certain forms of state
expropriation of originally state-conferred or commonlaw-recognized entitlement. The more
venerable the provenance and traditional the form of an entitlement, then, the “harder” and more
protected by the law it seems to be. The “endowment effect,” in a sense, appears to be enshrined
in as well as enhanced or perpetuated by the law itself.

2. In Citizen-Psychology
Responsible liberty is not merely a theoretical ideal or legal value. It is a lived reality, a
reality in relation to which the EEOR’s ideals and laws are understood. The American OS as
EEOR, then, will take account of real citizen-psychology in legally defining, fostering the spread
and vindicating the ownership of autonomy-conferring assets.
As it happens, a vast amount of recent empirical research supports the long-held
American intuition that asset-owning, in the senses elaborated in Part IV.A.1, conduces to the
rich form of responsible agency elaborated in Part III. Owning spawns thoughtful, hopeful,
forward-looking, active, participative, healthy, educated, confident, secure-feeling, achieving,
creative, civically and familially engaged, productive and responsible citizens. The same
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research might partly explain, and in turn be explained by, the law’s affording greater protection
to “old,” “hard” property than to “new” property, and to property than to contractual and other
entitlements. For it seems that “accumulated” and “hard-owned” – i.e., fully property-lawprotected – wealth produces the autonomy-enriching effects more starkly than does
unaccumulated “income” – either of the liability rule-protected, the “government entitlement” or
any other form. Assets in the EEOR or American OS, that is to say, are more like “stocks” than
“flows”.
One dramatic, though perhaps, in view of the endowment heuristic, ironic effect of
accumulated wealth-holding on individual psychology is its inducing an orientation toward the
future, and a consequent attitude of control thereover. Those who hold accumulated assets take
present choices specifically with an eye toward affecting their long-term future environments.
They “invest”. They take responsibility for the future, and they regard the future as in a sense
more real, more concrete. Those who do not hold wealth tend to orient choices only to the
present or very near future.196 These effects have been observed even when controlling for
differential income-flows as between those who have accumulated and those who have not, and
when controlling for the obvious causative role that an antecedent propensity to save presumably
would have played in accumulating in the first place.197 Asset-holding carries with it an
investing, future-affecting and caretaking mentality, which in turn fosters an attitude of
autonomy – the sense that one is not merely a passive object of fate and future, but a partcontroller of the same.198
Asset-holding also broadens the range of choices that people actually do make – and over
time, therefore, that they actively seek out or work to ensure that they will face. One illustrative
example here is a long-observed difference in behavior between participants in defined benefit
and defined contribution pension plans.199 Both are well settled legal entitlements that enjoy due
process protection, though defined contribution plans technically enjoy property protection while
defined benefit plans enjoy more contract-like protection.200 The latter also, through vesting and
drawing rules (forms of contingency), more tightly constrain rights of action. They also, by
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definition, entitle their owners merely to “flows,” not to “stocks.” And accumulated funds are
controlled by fiduciaries rather than by the merely passive, “beneficially” owning pensioners.
Such defined benefit pensioners, it has (unsurprisingly) been established, report feeling
more dependent upon the firms for which they labor. And they retire at a single prescribed
age.201 Participants in defined contribution plans, by contrast, are both more likely to retire
before the age of 60 and, perhaps more surprisingly, after the age of 65 than are participants in
defined benefit plans.202 And they report stronger perceptions of control and autonomy. Once
again, there is nothing particularly shocking in this. Those who legally possess more – and less
conditioned – individual control over assets simply face, trivially, more options that others do
not. And they tend to exercise those options. This in turn develops a more broadly-sweeping
“menu mentality,” which in turn assists in developing an autonomous – discriminating and
evaluating – personality, the personality of an American EEOR citizen-agent.203
One particularly salient type of choice-making and choice-seeking attitude that assetholding tends to support, a type especially valued by the CR tradition, is that of civic engagement
and political and economic participation. Social scientists and political theorists alike repeatedly
have observed that materially independent people, because they need not obey the naked, nonreason-mediated wills of others for their sustenance, must be persuaded by those others to do
what those others wish. They thus come to be treated as rational, autonomous deciders,204 and
not surprisingly come to regard themselves as such. In consequence, empirical work confirms,
they become more involved in their communities, in clubs and boards and organizations than do
non-owners – in effect transforming their physical capital into social capital.205 (They “bowl
alone” less than do others.206) Relatedly, owners are more energetically approached for support
by those who seek positions of political and other forms of leadership, a variation on the “need to
persuade” theme noted just above.207 Commensurately, owners are more active participants in
democratic political processes.208 This tendency is reinforced, of course, by the owners’ holding
of intelligible stakes in the socioeconomic-cum-political system and in society at large as
community leaders, etc. Owners accordingly perceive themselves both as more influential and
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as more called upon to wield influence as responsible “owners” of their polities, economies and
social systems.209 They become precisely those responsible, autonomous, politically and socially
participative freeholders envisioned by CR ideology from the time of its earliest formulations.
They also tend, of course, to become responsibly autonomous life-planners and life-builders of
the kind envisaged by CL.210 In doing so, they act productively in the way valued by PC.
Beyond economic, political and civic engagement, asset-holding also has been found
empirically to correlate with familial engagement and cohesion. This correlation could have
been anticipated after earlier studies linking family strife and dissolution with the pressures
wrought by poverty.211 But what newer studies show is that owned and accumulated assets bear
a more pronounced countervailing effect than do income-flows, even when controlling for
income-differentials between those who hold accumulated assets and those who do not.212 In
light of the observations made just above, again this will not surprise. In so far as accumulated
assets conduce to engagement and a sense of responsibility, and in so far as they conduce to a
sense of security and general well being, they can be expected to foster healthy relations with
intimates.
Telescoping from political, civic and familial well being to individual well being,
accumulated asset-owning correlates with superior cognitive function, academic achievement,
emotional adjustment and physical health among both adults and children.213 Again, these
findings are robust when controlling for differential income-flows among those who do and
those who do not hold accumulated assets.214 And of course, where children are the subjects of
study, superior cognitive function cannot be claimed to be the cause of the familial assetholding.215 Asset-owning in the senses limned in Part IV.A.1, then, appears from quite an early
stage, at quite a “micro”-oriented level of observation, to conduce to the development of healthy
citizen-agents of the kind extolled by the American EEOR.
It bears notice in this connection that the effects here observed to correlate with assetholding are empirically observed in other jurisdictions, outside of the US, as well as in the US.
The endowment effect is not confined to American holding. What we should expect of
Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

68

ownership in the American OS, then, might not be entirely contingent upon that OS’s being
American. There might be “universal” appeal to an OS, or at least universal “Western”
appeal.216 Studies of attitudes and self-reported welfare in Sweden, for example, where all have
been entitled to impressive magnitudes of state-provided welfare payment streams for many
decades,217 indicate that many people suffer from a sense of disempowerment and childlike
dependence upon choices made by others – in this case, state functionaries.218 The source of
these feelings is said to be the lack of personal control over the expenditures made upon each
subject’s behalf – even with the payment streams quite customarily secure, and even when more
or less the same expenditure choices would have been made by the subjects themselves had they
directed them. 219 Also at work here, evidently, is the implicit knowledge that those who give –
in this case, state functionaries – could in theory take away, both corroborating Reich’s claims
and suggesting that pre-welfare state forms of property rights are such forms as most conduce to
an independent EEOR citizenry.
Cross-national studies also suggest that, even after controlling for income and education
levels, citizens who own and control accumulated assets tend more highly to value initiative and
self-directedness on the part of themselves and their children, to be more flexible and creative,
and to be more chance- or risk-welcoming intellectually – corroborating a “wealth effect,”
cognate with the endowment effect, oft-observed by behavioral economists.220 This suggests,
again, that owner-citizens are likely ultimately to prove more productive, hence more of the PCappreciable type. It might, again, be thought that causality here could run the other way – that
people with such attributes simply tend to become the owners of accumulated and legally
protected assets in the relatively developed countries where they reside. There is strong
evidence, however, that at least in certain environments such attitudes do not themselves alone
bring differences in income or in wealth.221
Much, of course, remains to be done in empirically mapping these correlations and their
causal directions. But the substantial results that we find confirm our intuitions. And as a matter
of “common sense” it would seem reasonable to hypothesize a symbiosis in any event: Secure,
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accumulated, and personally controlled – owned – assets encourage a sense of independence and
capacity to choose and change the future, while such attitudes in turn prove in large part to be
self-fulfilling, resulting in accumulations of yet further wealth. With actual responsibility comes
a “responsible personality.”222 And responsible persons make for agent-citizens of the sort
envisaged by and celebrated in American self-understanding – the self-understanding of
inhabitants of the productive equal-rights republic – the EEOR or American OS.
3. In Sum, Working with the Abstraction & Endowment Effects
The observations elaborated in Parts IV.A.1 and IV.A.2 recommends some basic policy
parameters, or what might be called strategic considerations bearing upon how best to implement
an American OS. The EEOR which is the American OS is interested in ownership as a means of
facilitating the successful and responsible happiness-pursuit of independent, though also
interdependent, citizen-agents. That, along with exogenously given citizen-psychology and the
only gradually, incrementally changing nature of the exogenously given American legal
tradition, suggests that some pathways are clearer than others in delimiting assets and optimally
promoting their widespread ownership.
First, an American OS will recognize and foster ownership of the greatest variety of
choice-enhancing resources and opportunities possible.223 Innovative parcelings of assets along
material, temporal, and even contingency lines (so as to handle risk in addition to opportunity) –
generally effected now by contract – should be facilitated. These are rooted in the “abstraction
effect” noted above. And they have the effect of enhancing asset-generativity hence agent
autonomy. Where possible, such privately ordered asset-determination should be more fully
secured by law. This might counsel affording something more like property protection even to
contractual rights, e.g. by permitting liquidated damages clauses in contract, at least where
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contracting parties do not manifest unequal bargaining power.
Second and relatedly, the American OS will facilitate and foster the spread of markets in
which such spatio-temporal and contingency parceling and trading of parcels is effected. Such is
one aspect of facilitating such parceling itself, and additionally is one aspect of “completing” that
critically important market mechanism serving at the heart of the EEOR/American OS described
at Part III.C. But it also, more directly to the point of this Part, has the effect of enhancing assetliquidity per the terms of IV.A.1, which again enhances agent-citizen autonomy.
Third, the American OS will do such as it can to foster the spread of “durable,”
“accumulated” and legally secure assets among its citizenry. For those assets are, as we saw, in
a sense determined both by law and by owner-psychology “more owned” than other assets. And
they therefore conduce more strongly toward that practical and experienced autonomy that
characterizes the American EEOR’s agent-citizens. Those three features – durability,
accumulatedness and legal security – are for there parts, as discussed at IV.A.1, not practically
orthogonal, even if analytically distinct. For legal security in the American legal tradition
appears to ride pragmatically in part upon durability itself – the vintage form of property, so to
speak. And the empirical correlations between citizens’ agent-psychology on the one hand and
“accumulated” asset-holding on the other might in turn stem partly from the implicit knowledge
that one owns more legally-securely what one physically possesses. In any event, these
interrelations themselves yield a provisional policy prescription: First, as advised per the first
strategic counsel per the abstraction effect, “propertize” even liability-rule-protected and
government entitlements. But second, to the degree that we do not believe that we can do that,
owing to the “endowment effect” that is the only gradually changing American law itself, we
should work to foster the spread of “hard” and “accumulable” assets – the kind already enjoying
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property rule protection. Such are those as will foster the ongoing mentality of EEOR agentcitizens.
We shall recur to these broad policy guidelines, in this consolidated and catalogued form,
when we turn in the sequel to fully elaborated programs by which more fully to realize the
American OS. What is yet more interesting for immediate purposes is how these very general
American OS-prescribed policy directions interact with the constraints placed upon the EEOR’s
understanding of asset and ownership by its other guiding value. For the EEOR, recall, extols
not merely liberty, but liberty understood by reference to the equal opportunity principle.

B. Ownership & Responsibility
It is the qualifier “responsible” prefixed to “liberty” that occasions most challenge for the
law’s fortifying agency by delimiting, vindicating and promoting asset-ownership. In particular,
the problem arises between vindicating and promoting. Theoretically, the problem is readily
surmountable. Such was one upshot of Part III.B’s elaboration of responsible liberty as equal
opportunity. To “vindicate” just is to “promote” ownership no more and no less than
recommended by the EOP. Even practically the problem is containable and largely soluble.
Such was one upshot of Parts III.B through III.D. Part III as a whole, then, was in part the
working of a theoretic and in part the working of a practical, workable “settlement” of the
autonomy/externality “boundary dispute” that we observed at Part II in earlier times to have
plagued the three American political traditions’ attempts to settle upon workable principles of
ownership delimitation and vindication.
This Subpart traces the implications which that settlement bears for American law’s
delimiting and vindicating ownership. As in the previous Subpart, we find here that endowment
effects – again, both in the path-dependent features of the American legal tradition and as aspects
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of empirical ownership-psychology – delimit the boundaries of the practicable. Or at any rate
they recommend some means of vindicating ownership in keeping with the EOP as more
frictionless than others.

1. Once Again in Theory
The general ends entailed by the EEOR’s aim to vindicate responsible ownership are
easiest to characterize. At the highest level of abstraction, the goal is to realize ownership in
keeping with the EOP. That is the principle of ownership spread recommended by the American
CR, CL and PC traditions, all now synthesized into that overlapping consensus here called the
EEOR – the “ideal type” of a distinctively American OS.
Realizing the EOP, we saw in Part III.B, in turn requires that we work to equalize
holdings of ethically exogenous opportunity across owner-citizens, and that we honor unequal
holdings of ethically endogenous opportunities and resources – holdings traceable to responsible
choice. That goal, in turn, sometimes gives rise to a “tracing problem,” in turn resulting at times
in a “boundary dispute,” both also discussed in Part III. Those difficulties, for their parts, we
saw to be recalcitrant to “complete,” “definitive” solution. On the other hand, however, we also
saw that it is possible to confine the problem to a much narrower sphere of “hard cases” –
Sorites-reminiscent cases in which we are uncertain as to how free the will was, and how much
of the end product of will’s exercise is attributable to it, how much to mere luck – than has
hitherto been thought. One reason is that there is a broad terrain of readily measurable
opportunity and resource endowment that we all can agree to be ethically exogenous. The other
reason is that a properly constructed market mechanism enables us to sidestep the comparability
and commensurability challenges that render the tracing problem in non-market circumstances
less tractable.
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But all of this has been at the level of theory. What remains to do is to draw a
preliminary bead on what it will be to realize the theory in policy. It is here that the matter of
exogenous opportunity spreading becomes poignant, for boosting the holdings of the EOPunjustifiably underendowed requires that we diminish holdings – either present or future
holdings – of the EOP-unjustifiably overendowed. And that sets the stage for conflict, even after
we have agreed upon a practicable range of unambiguously exogenous endowments and a fair
and efficient asset-distribution mechanism per Parts III.C and D, above. For self-interest, on the
parts both of those who stand to gain and of those who stand to lose through a reapportionment,
has a way of clouding over the clarity with which we perceive even the most clear-cut of cases.
In order to deal with this problem, I once again endeavor to grapple in a bit more detail
with the constraints within which our efforts to realize theory in policy must operate. As in the
previous Subpart, those constraints are both psychological and legal in nature. But happily, we
shall see, the endowment heuristics observed in IV.A offer opportunity as well as constraint
here. We can exploit, that is, the present/future divide noted several subsections up. And the
“endowment” which is our law offers a great deal of leeway as well.

2. Using the Heuristics Wisely
Qualifying the nouns “liberty,” “agency,” “autonomy” and “ownership” with the
adjective “responsible” finds policy and legal expression in two practically related but distinct
sides of the opportunity and resource allocation process. Call them the “endowing” (or “giving”)
and the “delimiting” (or “taking”) sides. In so far as we circumscribe the prerogatives of
ownership in keeping with the equal liberty or equal opportunity principles, we work from the
“delimiting” side, and might superficially appear to be interfering with liberty or objectionably
confiscating what is owned. In so far as we act collectively to promote wider ownership of
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ethically exogenous resource and opportunity by more agent-citizens in keeping with the EOP,
we work from the “endowing” side and might superficially appear to be interfering with
responsibility, simply giving unearned “handouts”. When the “unearned handouts” appear to be
subsidized by the (superficially) seeming “takings,” dangers to the perceived legitimacy of
ownership-promoting action are at their most pronounced.
Public delimitation and promoting of ownership in keeping with the EOP will do well,
then, as a strategic matter to take account of ownership psychology in defining and fostering
responsible ownership, just as we noted at IV.A.2 that it should do in defining that which is
owned. This is simply a matter of prudence, or, say, avoidable-cost avoidance. Law and policy
that accommodate owner-psychology are law and policy that are likely to enjoy the widest
possible and longest enduring public support. Such support or its lack are experienced at all
“levels” of the policy-making and –implementing process – the public deliberating, legislating,
agency-implementing, adjudicating, and private-conforming levels.
The principal feature of ownership-psychology that operates here has already been
encountered. It is the endowment effect seen at IV.A to result in a perceived difference between
“hard,” “accumulated” wealth on the one hand, “soft,” “merely entitled” or liability-ruleprotected future “income” on the other.224 Moreover, when attention turns from ownership to
responsible ownership, the endowment effect appears to interact in “feedback” fashion with the
Part IV.A abstraction effect as well. Limitations upon the use and enjoyment or alienability of
what one already owns, that is – removing sticks from the bundle, so to speak – is itself seen as a
“taking” of the endowment.
The practical and strategic consequence of the endowment heuristic, both standing alone
and in infusing the abstraction effect, is two-fold. And again it operates at both the “taking” and
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the “endowing” sides of the opportunity-allocation process. From the “taking” side, limitations
on future growth in or bundling of asset-holdings by those who are over-endowed by EOP lights
are likely to face less opposition than “confiscations” of what already is held. From the
“endowing” side, endowing that takes the form of “refraining from [perceived] taking,” or of
conferring more abstraction rights, is likely to face less opposition – appear less like a “handout”
or “giveaway” – than will endowing that looks on the surface more like an out and out grant.
The policy-optimal strategy, then, in view of owner-psychology, will be the opposite of that
earlier-noted least optimal – the “taking and giving”. It will be the “channeling of new [and
perceivedly exogenous] wealth” to, and the “refraining from taking or restricting of wealth”
from, those who by EOP lights are presently opportunity-underendowed.
A classic case of “refraining” in recent years is the earned income tax credit, or “EITC,” a
program that has enjoyed widespread support even among “conservatives”.225 Its success stands
in instructive contrast to the unpopularity of “negative income tax” (NIT) proposals of the past,
surprisingly proposed by other “conservatives” of a Friedmanite cast, which were perceived
more as “givings” than is EITC notwithstanding their orthodox finance-theoretic equivalence.226
Suggested cases of the “channeling of the new,” for their part, were noted at IV.B.1. And such
programs are further elaborated in considerable detail in the sequel. For present purposes it
suffices simply to flag these two strategies. To some extent, they already find expression, from
time to time, both in law and in policy. But there is much more room here for policy-design, a
fact which the sequel exploits.
We should take note of a manner of “paradox” here, however. Apart from the
endowment heuristic, one other psychological effect wrought by asset-holding that we noted at
IV.A.2 is its tendency to induce in the holder a tendency to view the future as more concrete –
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the future itself, then, as more “endowed”. Might it be, then, that “taking from the future” rather
than from what is already accumulated, per the previous paragraph, faces some manner of
“natural limit” induced by the success of ownership-promotion itself?
Two considerations would seem to mitigate any such challenge as might arise in this
connection. The first consideration is that the endowment effect still presumably would
dominate – the “hardness” of accumulated assets would be greater than that of the “hardening”
future – in light both (a) of those accumulated assets’ causal role in that “hardening” of the future
and (b) of the greater degree of certainty, as a matter of law, of risk-attitude and perhaps
metaphysics, attaching to what is had than to what is expected. The second consideration,
dovetailing with the just noted matter of risk-attitude, is that the diminishing marginal utility of
wealth also presumably would continue to operate here, meaning that prospective future gains
would continue, as it were by definition, to be less salient to those who do not realize those gains
than are presently possessed increments of the same amount.
Two other strategies are more incremental in nature than the “rechannelling” and
“refraining” strategies. Again they fall one each on the “endowing” and “delimiting” sides of
asset-allocation. On the endowing side, the strategy is to condition collective endowing of the
underendowed upon recipients’ acting in some manner easily characterizable either as “earning”
the perceived “handouts” or as being otherwise deserving of them on some ground explicitly tied
to the endowed item’s ethical exogeneity. Requiring some manner of service – e.g., military or
community service – as consideration for receipt then, or requiring that recipients use endowed
funds only for education or medicine or productive investment, is a strategy that both should be
and increasingly already can be seen at work. We find it, e.g., in IRA, IDA, proposed taxfavored “private health accounts,” “education accounts,” and other programs that the sequel
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considers under the rubric of “Piecemeal Asset-Accumulation Programs”. In essence, the
endowment itself is delimited in these cases in a manner commensurate with delimitation of the
prerogatives of the already endowed by the “responsible” – hence, equal exogeneity, unequal
endogeneity – qualifier.
On the “taking” side, the incremental approach is simply to refrain from “confiscating”
all of the attributes of the overage held by the overendowed, and to skim what is skimmed from
the overage off of the less tactile “sticks” in that “bundle” of rights which is ownership. Hence,
one does not confiscate the property, but restricts its use or alienability, or taxes its use or
alienability, or guaranties others some rights – easements – in its use. Familiar examples are the
estate tax, the imposition of public access rights to the electromagnetic spectrum, and community
reinvestment requirements placed upon depository institutions. This line of strategy takes us
more squarely to the other, non-psychological parameters within which ownership-facilitation
must operate. Those are the legal ones.

3. Using the Legal Endowment
As with “asset”-defining, ownership-delimiting subjects policy to some of the pathdependent features of American law. As it happens, however, path-dependence here proves
rather helpful for purposes of ownership-promotion in vindication of the EOP. For the law
appears to incorporate within its constitutional and property doctrines the same heuristics,
rational or irrational, that characterize the psychology of ownership. That means that the law
permits precisely those strategies of ownership-delimitation in keeping with responsible agency
that were just observed in IV.B.2 to be prudent. Barring any radical departures from established
precedent by an activist bench or extremist legislature, then, the facilitation of responsible
ownership in keeping with the values of the American OS should be legally free to proceed along
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the lines sketched just above in IV.B.2.
The standard forms that ownership-delimitation takes in American law are, of course,
essentially of three types – restrictions on use and enjoyment, restrictions on alienability, and
limited expropriation, the latter generally in the form of licensing fees or taxes.227 The courts
impose few if any limitations upon legislatures’ powers to employ these methods.
Restrictions on use and enjoyment are widely accepted, with some limited exceptions to
be noted below. And few citizens seem to regard them as threatening the US’s status as a
property-protecting polity. That acceptance probably reflects implicit acceptance of the
responsible ownership principle and with it recognition of the danger of illegitimate costexternalization by owners.
Restrictions upon alienability similarly appear to be widely upheld by the courts and
accepted by the public, though we’ll see that there is sometimes more controversy here.
Prohibitions on vote-selling, self-indenture, prostitution, organ-sale and child-sale are familiar,
and scarcely controversial, cases in point. Few seem to regard them as serious threats to US
status as a property-protective polity.228
One long-standing form of restriction upon asset-alienability in the US dovetails with the
other principal form of ownership-delimitation, taxation: the taxation of one form of wealthalienation itself. Like other forms of limited and incremental expropriation – e.g., property-,
income-, and sales-taxation – estate and gift taxation has not tended to be seen as threatening the
US’s status as a property-protecting polity, although there are of course some fringe elements
who continue to argue that the income tax, since its 1913 inception, has been “unconstitutional”.
Indeed, estate-taxation and progressive income-taxation have widely been viewed and justified,
in CL terms, as means of partly rectifying perceived injustices in the distribution of ethically
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exogenous endowments. And they have been seen in CR terms as means of preserving the longterm health of the republic by preventing republic-threatening aggregations of financial and
consequent political power. Such arguments are still regarded as mainstream. Taxation also has,
of course, long enjoyed a special degree of deference by courts.229
Two relatively recent exceptions to these long American traditions of ownershipdelimitation warrant special notice, however. The first such departure is the so-called
“regulatory takings” doctrine, which represents a potential – though only a potential – threat to
the incrementalist form of ownership-delimitation in keeping with the responsible ownership
principle recommended above. The familiar foundational idea here is that since the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution requires that public authorities award just
compensation to those from whom property is fully expropriated pursuant to the power of
eminent domain, regulations which have the effect of merely diminishing the market value of
property – public access rights or easements, for example – should be regarded as partial takings
also giving rise to a duty to compensate at market value. Initially the courts were less than
hospitable to this orthodox-financially fair argument, perhaps again revealing that the law is
more concerned for “hard” accumulated assets than for “speculative” future value, or perhaps
simply recognizing that the underlying assets – the airwaves, access to the ocean, etc. – are
ethically exogenous endowments belonging residually to the public. But in recent years some
courts have shown greater receptivity to the doctrine.230
That the argument is orthodox-financially fair of course does not entail that the regulatory
takings doctrine promotes fairness. For example, applied so as to dictate “compensation” to one
who purchases land in full knowledge either that the underlying asset is unambiguously ethically
exogenous hence public, or that a regulation is impending, and who thus presumptively
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purchases the land at a discount in view of that common knowledge, the regulatory takings
doctrine would in fact dictate a “giving”.
But the real ethical threat posed by the regulatory takings doctrine is distinct from that.
The doctrine as currently articulated and evolved by the courts does not seem to have any
purchase on the sorts of ownership-delimitation strategies in keeping with the EOP advocated in
the previous few Subparts. The principle underlying the doctrine, however, which is simply that,
heuristics notwithstanding, an incremental delimitation of ownership is a diminishment of
ownership, is of course generalizable. And it has been generalized by some advocates, even to
the point of declaring many forms of taxation itself to constitute unconstitutional “takings.”231
And here the problem is that what is trivially true as a matter of rudimentary finance nonetheless
is deeply out of synch with the American value of equal opportunity. For it entirely – entirely –
ignores the ethical exogeneity, fairness or otherwise of the baseline wealth-distribution from
which taxation proceeds.232 Even taxation of what all would agree to be an overage held by one
person by way of ethically exogenous opportunity endowment therefore is viewed, by this
argument, as prohibited by the US Constitution. The polity is thus constitutionally debarred
from living up to its own equal opportunity ideals, themselves enshrined in the Constitution.233
That means that the longstanding American tradition of valuing and vindicating equal
opportunity is inimical to America’s own Constitution. Even to state this proposition is, of
course, in effect to refute it. And happily the courts have agreed. But the argument has gained
some purchase in some fringe policy circles, from who also has emanated the second
rudimentary departure from the American tradition of responsible ownership.
The second exception to the American tradition of responsible ownership has made its
appearance not in the courts, but in the legislatures and in policy debates. Both for this reason
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and by virtue of its even shakier ethical foundations, this movement is more easily dispatched
than was the first. It is the movement, on the part of some self-described “conservative” pundits
and politicians, to curtail or even eliminate estate and gift taxation, which they label “death”
taxation, and to lessen the degree of progressivity found in the income tax – a change that they
call “simplification”. This movement simply has no basis in fairness or in any other American
value – CR, CL or PC. It is nothing more than a naked grab for the long end of ethically
exogenous opportunity inequity by those who have fared well in the birth lottery, i.e., who have
benefited by injustice. By exploiting the degree to which the US now falls short of its original
republican, deliberative democratic ideals – deciding matters of public import as it currently does
by crude Pavlovian association via relentlessly repetitive and reinforcing televisual images,
slogans and soundbites – the proponents of these changes deceive those who are too time-taxed
by their wage-occupations or numbed by vulgar Imperial Rome-reminiscent entertainments to
conduct their own investigations, into thinking that the changes will enable these same people to
“keep [their] own money.”234 And so they enjoy some success in the short term. But as publicly
provided public goods are scaled-back in the wake of consequent public fiscal deficits, it appears
unlikely that this conjure will continue to succeed. It is nonetheless up to all of us, however, to
ensure that it does not. That takes us to the present Article’s conclusion and sequel.
V. CONCLUSION: FROM THEORETIC COHERENCE TO IMPLEMENTARY COHERENCE
This Article has covered a fair bit of territory, though more remains to be covered before
a coherent American OS can be implemented. We have identified three political traditions –
three broad national self-understandings – that mutually exhaust the normative space of
American public policy-making. We have identified a broad intersection of overlapping
consensus among the three traditions, at least where ownership is concerned, synthesizing one
self-understanding that affords a normative conceptual coherence to our coming efforts to realize
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an “ownership society”. And we have translated this self-understanding – the efficient equalopportunity republic, constituted by agent-citizens endowed with equal opportunity, pursuing
happiness responsibly and freely – into distinctively American legal and psychological terms of
ownership and ownership-promotion.
What remains to be done is to translate those legal and psychological terms of ownership
and ownership-promotion, in turn, into detailed programs – programs that promote and programs
that protect ownership in keeping both (a) with the values of the EEOR, and (b) with the law and
ownership psychology of American citizens. Such is the task of the present Article’s sequel.
That sequel first reinterprets, under the aspect of the “core” vision distilled in Parts III and IV of
the present Article, past “ownership society” programs and proposals. It shows a uniform
ideological and financial engineering trajectory at work in all of them – a trajectory that is more
readily distilled now that the present Article’s work is completed. The sequel then works to
consummate that trajectory. It does so by forging a cohesive package of proposals that is
informed by the successes and failures of past programs and proposals as interpreted under the
aspect of the theory worked out in the present Article. It is a package that makes strategic use of
the behavioral finance (endowment effect) and derivative finance (abstraction effect) lessons
highlighted in Part IV of the present Article, as well as of securitization finance lessons
highlighted in the historical portions of the sequel itself. The upshot is a fully specified and
designed American OS that makes liberal use of the market mechanism described above in Part
III and amounts to a practical realization of the EEOR sketched in that same Part.
Both in summation of the present Article and in anticipation of the next, it is perhaps
worth making explicit one fact that till now has been largely implicit. It is that an “ownership
society” is not simply a society in which some people own. If that were the case, we would
inhabit an OS already, and there would be no purpose save the purposes of chicanery in holding
out “the ownership society” as an ideal. An ownership society is not a society in which we are
all “on our own”. That would be, among other things, a society without law. Indeed it would
indeed not be a “society” at all. Nor is an ownership society a society in which armed force
Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

83

labeled public acts solely to protect the earlier expropriations exacted by select sectional interests
that are private. That would be a banana republic. An American OS or EEOR, rather, is a
community of citizen-agents who act jointly, under the rule of law, to promote and to protect the
independence, equal liberties and equal opportunities, as manifest in ownership rights, of one
another. Precisely that vision, we have seen, is what animates our three traditions of selfunderstanding, at least where ownership is concerned. And precisely that vision, we shall see, is
what inchoately has animated American OS programs and proposals till now. That view now
will animate, more choately, coherently and self-consciously than before, that package of
programs laid out and proposed in the sequel as well.
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132
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equilibria”. For more on such equilibria, their fairness and efficiency properties, and ethical interpretations thereof,
see Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74 at 217-39. The technical literature on the theory of fair allocations is
vast, though oddly ignored by economically oriented legal academics. For a canonical sampling, see, e.g., T.E.
Daniel, A Revised Concept of Distributional Equity, 11 J. ECON. THEORY 94 (1975); Duncan Foley, Resource
Allocation and the Public Sector, YALE ECONOMIC ESSAYS 7, at 45-98 (1967); E.A. Pazner & David Schmeidler,
Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity, 92 Q.J. ECON. 1 (1978); Elisha Pazner &
David Schmeidler, A Difficulty in the Concept of Fairness, 41 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 441, 441-43 (1974); H.R.
Varian, Equity, Envy and Efficiency, 9 J. ECON. THEORY, 63, 63-91 (1974); H.R. Varian, Two Problems in the
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Theory of Fairness, 5 J. PUB. ECON. 249 (1976). See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS:
APPLICATIONS AND THEORY (1986); W. Thomson & Hal Varian, Theories of Justice Based on Symmetry, in SOCIAL
GOALS AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 140. A useful recent synthesis of these results is HERVÉ MOULIN,
FAIR DIVISION AND COLLECTIVE WELFARE (2003). The work from which these studies take their departure is of
course LEON WALRAS, ELEMENTS OF PURE ECONOMICS (William Jaffé trans., 1954) (1844). Walras appears to have
anticipated, even inchoately to have intended, precisely such developments as these. See WILLAM JAFFÉ’S ESSAYS
ON WALRAS 17-52, 326-42 (Donald A. Walker ed., 1983).
152

See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74 at 143-55; Hockett & Risse, supra note 141.

153

Id. The claim that the need to index disparate resources commits one to perfectionism – i.e., the position
that some goods simply are inherently worth more than others – figures into a prominent criticism of Rawlsian
primary goods leveled by Richard Arneson. See Richard Arneson, Primary Goods Reconsidered, 24 NOÛS 429
(1990). The criticism is addressed in Hockett & Risse, id.
154

155

See cites supra, note 152.
Such is envisaged in Dworkin’s “clamshell” auction. See DWORKIN, supra note 74 at 65-71.

156

See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74 at 217-37; DWORKIN, supra note 74 at 307-50. Real, rather
than “hypothetical” such insurance is proposed in Hockett, Macrohedge, supra note 136; and in Alexander
Tabarrok, Trumping the Genetic Tarot Card, 9 CONTINGENCIES 20 (1997). See also J.H. Cochrane, Time-Consistent
Health Insurance, 103 J. POL. ECON. 445 (1995).
157

The classic contemporary objection to “commodification” is of course Margaret Jane Radin, MarketInalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES
(1996). ALSO ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1997). Contemporary protests of
commodification revive concerns raised repeatedly in the past. Two classic Victorian-era objections are THOMAS
CARLYLE, PAST AND PRESENT (Robert Thorne ed., 1890); and JOHN RUSKIN, UNTO THIS LAST AND OTHER
WRITINGS 155-228 (Clive Wilmer ed., 1985).
158

The allusion is of course to Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby
Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978), one of the bugbears that prompted Radin, id.
159

This question reemerges below, in connection with Part IV’s discussion of the legal dimensions of

owning.
160

See Robert C. Merton, Lifetime Portfolio Selection Under Uncertainty: The Continuous-Time Case, 51
REV. ECON. & STAT. 247 (1969); Robert C. Merton, Optimum Consumption and Portfolio Rules in a ContinuousTime Model, 3 J. ECON. THEORY 373 (1971); Robert C. Merton, Continuous-Time Portfolio Theory and the Pricing
of Contingent Claims, Working Paper No. 881-76, A.P. Sloan School of Management, MIT (1976).
161

Hockett, Macrohedge, supra note 136.

162

See Oliver D. Hart, On the Optimality of Equilibrium When the Market Structure is Incomplete, 11 J.
ECON. THEORY 418 (1975).
163

See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 595 (6th ed. 1990).

164

Of course the Pareto principle is intended to afford technical means of sidestepping interpersonal utility
comparison and with it, therefore, the standard argument runs, aggregation. But leaving aside for present purposes
the standard argument’s running aggregation and comparison together, the Pareto criterion trades for its ethical
salience upon an intuition which implicitly imports aggregation. There is no reason for “society” to be interested in
a Pareto-efficient social choice rule dictating increases in the utilities of some so long as no one else’s utilities are
diminished thereby, unless “society” itself is seen as thereby benefiting in some sense. That sense, if such there be,
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is the only sense in which the principle can be ethically interesting, and it is of course an aggregative sense – as
indeed the terms “society” and “social choice” should indicate right from the start. On the analytic distinction
between interpersonal comparison and aggregation, see sources cited supra, note 140.
165

The aggregation – and assumed interpersonal comparability imported thereby – enter via the
“compensation principle.” Note the shared root – “com,” i.e., “with” – shared by both “comparison” and
“compensation.”
166

One “produces” welfare, in the Pareto and the Kaldor-Hicks senses, by distribution operations. Those
are the variable inputs, so to speak, while persons’ utility functions are the fixed inputs.
167

See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74 at 198-205. A classic articulation of the argument is found
in Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 191 (1980); and Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980). See also Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in 1 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN
VALUES 12 (S. McMurrin ed., 1980). I hope to render the claim more intuitively appreciable here than is the case in
those sources, in hopes of thereby avoiding the incomprehension manifest, among other places, in Posner, supra
note 106.
168

Herewith of course a variation on Nozick’s “utility monster” objection to utilitarianism. See NOZICK,
supra note 78 at 110 (“Utilitarian theory is embarrassed by the possibility of utility monsters who get enormously
greater sums of utility from any sacrifice of others than these others lose . . . the theory seems to require that we all
be sacrificed in the monster’s maw, in order to increase total utility.”).
169

Compare the inert matter considered above in connection with the measurement challenges, supra note
145. It is the same story here. It is agency – usefulness to valuing agents – that infuses any substance with value.
(A variation here, perhaps, on the adage that “man is the measure of all things”.) And it is only equal agency that
renders the valuation of such a substance a valuation effected legitimately by us all, hence “value” in a sense
cognizable to “us” all and hence to ethics. The belief that at least aggregated welfare, as distinguished from wealth,
is a value, since it is pleasure or some such humanly experienced magnititude rather than mere money, does not
escape this stricture. For again, welfare, satisfaction, pleasure, etc. as such do not engage “us” as items to be valued
apart from the propriety of their apportionments. The belief that “aggregated” such magnitudes constitute values
results from a subconscious elision from thinking in terms of one agent experiencing welfare, to an “agential”
aggregation of persons, conceived inchoately as one person, “experiencing” such welfare. Once one becomes
conscious that one is doing this, one escapes the illusion. Much the same illusion, incidentally, underwrites
Harsanyi’s aggregation and impartial observer theorems, cited supra note 107. These turn out to be representation
theorems – representations of ordinal measures in cardinal form – rather than theorems “proving” utilitarianism to
be a dictate of rationality itself. See ROEMER, supra note 140 at 138-50 on this point.
170

This is not to say that such trading itself cannot bear third-party effects such that over time ethically
exogenous resources come to be centralized in undeserving, overendowed hands. But that is why market-neutrality
above is defined not only in initial endowment terms, but in ongoing regulatory terms as well.
171

The equal rights qualifier spares the thesis of self-ownership from such objections as Jerry Cohen raises
against such as Nozick. See G.A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, World-Ownership, and Equality, in JUSTICE AND
EQUALITY HERE AND NOW (Frank Lucash ed., 1986); G.A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, World-Ownership, and
Equality: Part II, 3 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 1 (1986).
172

The critical role of assets in affording practical freedom is well laid out in, among other places,
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999). See also DASGUPTA, supra note 135. Sen’s and Dasgupta’s
work focuses on “developing” economies, but the lessons are readily extended to “developed” economies –
particularly to their less developed sectors.
173

More on the problematic but nonetheless critical notion of “hardness” below.
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Again, please see Parts III.A through III.C, supra, on agency, responsible agency and the equal
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opportunity principle. And see Part IV.B, infra, for more on the EOP’s expression in law.
175

I will not here distinguish between endowment effects, loss-aversion or willingness-toaccept/willingness-to-pay gaps. Nor will I distinguish between these and the more clearly conceptually distinct,
though nonetheless empirically entangled, phenomena of status quo bias, commission/omission disparity or
disposition effects. There is of course a vast and growing literature on these and cognate subjects. Useful surveys
include Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP.
193 (1991); Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Colin F.
Camerer et al., eds., 2004); and Colin F. Camerer, Endowment Effects and Buying-Selling Price Gaps, in
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 665-70 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995). Fuller collections
of seminal work include JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1982); CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); QUASI-RATIONAL
ECONOMICS (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1991); ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1993);
Camerer et al., op. cit.; Kagel & Roth, op. cit. A popular-audience-targeted treatment of these phenomena is
RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE (1994).
176

See Matthew Rabin, Risk-Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem, 86
ECONOMETRICA 11 (2001).
177

See, e.g., MARTIN SHUBIK, 1 THE THEORY OF MONEY AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 399-427 (2000).
See also JAMES TOBIN, MONEY, CREDIT, AND CAPITAL 12-14 (1998) (emphasizing, however, only the temporal rate
at which the asset can be converted to cash.)
178

Durability is related to, but nonetheless distinct from, Tobin’s “predictability.” See TOBIN, supra note
177 at 16-20, 23-26. “Predictability” refers to the degree to which an asset’s cash value at future dates can be
accurately anticipated. Id.
179

See George Sternlieb & James W. Hughes, The Evolution of Housing and Its Social Compact, in
FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS 143 (J. Paul Mitchell ed., 1995) (emphasizing housing’s role as “safe
haven” against ravages of inflation as much as from “the elements”).
180

My fellow citizens might also protect me by agreeing to pool risk with me and thus insure. More on this
form of joint-indemnification below.
181

See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract
Interface, Draft 10/28/00, on file with Yale Center for Law, Economics & Organization; Henry E. Smith, Two
Dimensions of Property Rights, Draft 3/31/00, on file with Northwestern University School of Law.
182

But see Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1105 (2003), on the role that such limitations might, under some circumstances, play in facilitating liquidity and
choice by economizing on the information costs that afflict markets in ownable goods. See also JON ELSTER,
ULYSSES UNBOUND (2000); and ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS, supra note 118 on circumstances under which
constraining choice might enhance autonomy.
Analogy with language seems particularly apt. The latter dramatically extends the range of thoughts and
objects of thought that one can entertain, hence, in a sense, one’s cognitive autonomy. More property types mean
more autonomy just as more vocabulary means more thought. But some coherent set of rules bounding and
governing these matters – the structuring of language by definitions and grammar, the delimitation and vindication
of property-holding and -exchange by law – also are required lest autonomy degenerate into a cacophonous and
incoherent heteronomy.
183

With the caveat mentioned in the previous note. On the relations among such market completeness,
choice, autonomy and welfare, see, again, Parts III.C-D, supra.
184

See note 182, supra.
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185

Tobin also singles out what he terms an asset’s “divisibility” as a fundamental attribute. He limits his
discussion, however, to fractional unit sizes, as it were along a single dimension – that of simple quantity. See
TOBIN, supra note 177 at 15.
186

Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). See also Charles Reich, Individual Rights
and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L. J. 1247 (1965); Frank Michelman, Forward: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); William H. Simon, Rights and
Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1431 (1986).
187

397 U.S. 254 (1970).

188

See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970) (now the Burger Court, upholding a
Maryland regulation having the effect of holding maximum AFDC grant below the established needs of some
families) (observing that “here we deal with state regulation in the social and economic field, not affecting freedom
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights”).
189

[Cite]

190

See note 188, supra.

191

See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (“Lujan II”); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Federation,
497 U.S. 871 (1990).
192

Lujan II, id. at 572.

193

If we add to this consideration the fact that the US Supreme Court’s “takings” jurisprudence under the
5 Amendment appears to be bringing greater security to “old” property even against democratically decided actions
by the state, traditional assets definitely look to be increasingly “asset-like” along the legal security metric relative
to more newfangled entitlements. They are the assets that “nobody can take away from you.” Hence they are the
assets most “owned.” More on this infra, Part IV.B.3.
th

194

Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
195

As a practical matter, of course, a government entitlement might nonetheless be more secure in some
instances once we take into account the law’s other realms that bear upon the security of a contractual entitlement.
The federal government – at least up to now – does not go bankrupt, for example.
196

The causality, one might expect, should run both ways. An “investment mentality” would seem more
likely to result in asset-accumulation than would a profligate, “live for the moment” mentality. Studies controlling
for the bidirectional causal effect have found nonetheless that asset-holding itself fosters investment attitudes that
lead to more asset-holding. See Gautam N. Yadama & Michael Sherraden, Effects of Assets on Attitudes and
Behaviors: Advance Test of a Social Policy Proposal, Working Paper No. 95-2, Center for Social Development
(1995); Deborah Page-Adams & Michael Sherraden, What We Know About Effects of Asset Holding: Implications
for Research on Asset-Based Anti-Poverty Initiatives, Working Paper No. 96-1, Center for Social Development
(1996); S. Beverly et al., A Framework of Asset-Accumulation Stages and Strategies, Working Paper No. 01-1,
Center for Social Development (2001); A.M. McBride, The Effects of Individual Development Account Programs:
Perceptions of Participants, Working Paper No. 03-06, Center for Social Development (2003); Michael Sherraden
et al., Overcoming Poverty: Supported Saving as a Household Development Strategy, Working Paper No. 04-14,
Center for Social Development (2004). See also Sherraden, supra note 3 at 151-57.
197

See sources cited supra, note 196.

198

Id.

Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

100

199

Defined benefit plans guarantee a payment stream to beneficiaries, while the assets from which those
payments are derived remain under the control of the pension fund manager. Defined contribution plans involve
facilitation and (in many but not all cases) supplementation of beneficiary savings in their own accounts. See
generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 42-55 (3d ed. 2000); E.
PHILIP DAVIS, PENSION FUNDS: RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY AND CAPITAL MARKETS, AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 230-44 (1995); PENSIONS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 139-60 (Zvi Bodie et al. ed., 1988).
200

It is not clear that property rules and liability rules diverge, however, when the property in question is

monetary.
201

See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L. J. 451 (2004); James Stock
& David A. Wise, The Pension Inducement to Retire: An Option Value Analysis, NBER Working Paper No. 2660
(1988).
202

See Stock & Wise, id.

203

See sources cited supra, note 196.

204

At any rate, as people who must be deceived or manipulated rather than simply ordered about.

205

See, e.g., C. WRIGHT MILLS, WHITE COLLAR: THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASSES (1953); GABRIEL
KOLKO, WEALTH AND POWER IN AMERICA (1962); G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF, THE HIGHER CIRCLES: THE OWNING
CLASS IN AMERICA (1971); Anthony F. Shorrocks, U.K. Wealth Distribution: Current Evidence and Future
Prospects, in GROWTH, ACCUMULATION, AND UNPRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY 29-50 (Edward Wolff ed., 1987); Denis
Kessler & Andre Masson, Personal Wealth Distribution in France: Cross-Sectional Evidence and Extensions, in
Wolf, id. at 141-76. See also sources cited supra, note 194.
206

The allusion is of course to PUTNAM, supra note 83. The claim, of course, is not that insufficient
stakeholding is the only cause of “bowling alone”. It is only that stakeholding constitutes a countervailing influence.
207

See sources cited supra, notes 196 and 205.

208

Id.

209

See Simon, supra note 23 at 1350-1388, who makes a similar point as a conceptual rather than as a
social-psychological matter. See sources cited supra, note 205. Also McBride, supra note 196.
210

See sources cited supra, notes 196 and 205. Also A.M. McBride et al., Civic Engagement Among LowIncome and Low-Wealth Families: In Their Words, Working Paper No. 04-14, Center for Social Development
(2004).
211

On that correlation, see, e.g., ROBERT HOCKETT, CHAKA’S WINDOWS: WORKS AND DAYS IN THE LIFE OF
A HOMELESS ENTREPRENEUR (unpublished MS on file with the author); ELLIOT LIEBOW, TALLEY’S CORNER: A
STUDY OF NEGRO STREETCORNER MEN (1967); DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, FAMILY AND NATION (1965).
212

See McBride, supra note 1964; Sherraden, supra note 196; McBride et al., supra note 210.

213

See T.R. Williams, The Impacts of Household Wealth on Childhood Development, Working Paper No.
04-07, Center for Social Development (2004); A.M. McBride et al., Asset Building: Increasing Capacity for
Performance: Measurement and Effects, Working Paper No. 04-12, Center for Social Development (2004); Deb
Page-Adams et al., Assets, Health, and Well Being: Neighborhoods, Families, Children and Youth, Working Paper
No. 01-02, Center for Social Development (2001); Sherraden et al., supra note 196; McBride et al., supra note 196.
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214

Id.

215

Though of course it might be for parents. More study is required here, controlling for causation in the
other direction. A reasonable working hypothesis would be that among adults causality proceeds in both directions.
216

World Bank and other international civil servants speculate on the prospects of “ownership society”-like
proposals in the developing economies in CURING WORLD POVERTY: THE NEW ROLE OF PROPERTY (John H. Miller
ed., 1994).
217

See generally JONAS PONTUSSON, THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: INVESTMENT POLITICS IN
SWEDEN (1992).
218

See HUGH HECLO & HENRIK MADSEN, POLICY AND POLITICS IN SWEDEN (1987); Tony Horwitz, Welfare
Stagnation Besets Smug Sweden, WALL ST. J., April 5, 1990, at A18.
219

Id. The reports of defined benefit pensioners discussed supra, notes 199-202 and accompanying text,
come back to mind.
220

See Melvin Kohn et al., Position in the Class Structure and Psychological Functioning in the U.S.,
Japan, and Poland, 95 AM. J. SOC. 964-1008 (1990).
221

Id.

222

See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 310-13 (1988); Gregory S. Alexander,
Pensioners in America: The Economic Triumph and Political Limitations of Passive Ownership, in A FOURTH
WAY?: PRIVATIZATION, PROPERTY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW MARKET ECONOMIES 33, 42-43 (1994) in this
connection.
223

“Possible” here of course presumably will be bounded by information and transacting costs. See notes
181-182, supra, and accompanying text.
224

See notes 175-176, supra, and accompanying text.

225

See Internal Revenue Code § 32.

226

See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 75-85, 161-76 (1962); James Tobin et al., Is a
Negative Income Tax Practical?, 77 YALE L. J. 6 (1967).
227

These are restrictions apart from limitations on security-provision of the sort observed at Part IV.A.1.
The latter do not much come into play when we speak of ownership-delimiting in keeping with the EOP. They
figure more into what sort should be increased among the underendowed.
228

Milton Friedman noted long ago that the ability to sell “shares” in one’s self or one’s future earnings
would facilitate borrowing for education (human capital expansion projects). See FRIEDMAN, supra note 226 at 85107 (1962). But fewer people appear to have taken that suggestion to heart even than have supported the proposal of
Landes & Posner, supra note 158.
229

The classic decision holding legislatures’ taxing authority to be plenary is of course Magnano Co. v.
Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934).
230

See Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Seawall Associates v.
City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. Ct. Appeals), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 500 (1989). But see Pennell v. City
of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
231

See EPSTEIN, supra note 78.
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232

Hence the market that it would rely upon to value the “taken” increment is not “neutral” in the terms of
Part III.C. Even Nozick at least paid lip-service to the importance of the baseline question, in his Paretian version of
the Lockean proviso. See NOZICK, supra note 78 at 178-82.
233

See U.S. Const., amend. V, cl. 2.

234

The claim that “it’s your money,” of course, is either flatly false or vacuous. It is false in so far as
what’s “yours” is a function of legal entitlement and the law does not already entitle you to it. It is vacuous in so far
as the law already confers title. What these people mean to say is that they want to make it your money. That is,
they want to make $300 your money, in return for your forgoing public services, if you belong to the middle class;
and they want to make $ thousands, millions or billions your money if you are antecedently wealthy.
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